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Abstract 
Regional offices grow of more and more importance for the interest representation 
in Brussels. This study involves what determines if a region takes lobbying 
actions, what mobilization variables are important for the performance and what 
lobbying strategy is supposed to be the most successful. The study is a case study 
on the regional mobilization within the development of the ‘EU Strategy for the 
Baltic Sea Region’ and is based on empirical data gained by interviews with 
regional offices and Commission officials. Since there is usually a lack of 
theoretical backgrounds within lobbying, a theoretical framework with different 
lobbying strategies and several mobilization variables that determine these 
strategies was evolved. It turned out that the variables of representation, agenda 
setting and resources are the main influences for the different strategies, which is 
highly related to the decision making power of the region, the amount of partners 
established in the office and the interest in European issues at the home level. The 
main instrument used by the offices, a coalition, was not as successful as 
expected. A model of mobilization types is presented which distinguish ‘the 
committed’, ‘the follower’ and ‘the reluctant’.  
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1 Design and Outline of the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
Since almost 25 years a phenomena has reached Brussels, the establishment of 
regional offices towards the EU. Today over 160 regions are present and most of 
them have, besides other tasks, a clear mandate: to lobby for their regions (Marks 
et.al. 2002). This paper wants to identify what factors of mobilization are 
important to fulfill this aim1. Marks et al. examined a very good study on why the 
regional offices mobilize themselves at a European level (Marks et. al. 1996) and 
this study takes this up and asks how they mobilize once they are on a European 
level. Only the fact that the regional offices are present does not automatically 
mean that they have influence. “Ineffective political actors might gain access to an 
institution without being able to translate this advantage into concrete policy 
outcomes” (Bouwen 2002: 366). In particular, the study wants to identify what 
has been done to influence an upcoming initiative, the ‘EU strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region’2. Based on this study the paper should tell both what is and what 
should be done within regional interest representation. The focus lies more on 
mobilization factors and less on influence in general. Rather, it points out what 
factors are responsible for the performance of the offices. In short, the following 
research questions should be answered:  
 
This paper aims at creating a framework that helps to explain what different 
lobbying attributes are present within the different lobbying offices based on the 
BSS and a near complete study on the influence of the regional offices on the BSS 
should be delivered. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 The ways of regional lobbying are manifold. In this study only the ‘Brussels route’ will be 
discussed. Summaries and explanations how the regional level developed on the European stage 
can be found at various sources, Jeffery and Hooghe Marks being two of them (Jeffery 2000: 4ff; 
Hooghe and Marks 1996). 
2
 Although this the full name of the initiative the name under what it is commonly known, ‘Baltic 
Sea Strategy’, is used throughout the paper. 
• What mobilization variables determine which lobbying strategy is used? 
• What form of lobbying tactics and mobilization is the most successful? 
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1.2 Outline 
This paper wants to explain what actions were taken by the regional offices to 
influence the BSS and what determines them. A theoretical framework will be 
created to itemize these different factors. Unlike most other works done on 
regional influence, this paper aims to connect the practice with the theory. It 
wants to explain in theoretical terms what is happening at a practical level and 
should help determine what mobilization attempts are best. This study is more 
interested in determining what aspects must be fulfilled to be successful, however, 
it will not point out which of the offices was most successful. Firstly, this is not in 
the interest of the study and secondly, a more extensive study must be done to 
answer this.  
As aforementioned, the outline of the study is based upon applying a 
theoretical framework towards practice. First, the method and existing literature 
will be introduced and within the following chapters the developments within the 
fields of lobbying, regional representations and the BSS are presented. This 
should pave the way for the development of the theoretical framework in chapter 
5. This is done through highlighting the different lobbying strategies and the 
variables that are expected to have an impact on performance. Chapter 6 connects 
the theoretical framework with the findings from the case study and within 
chapter 7 a short analysis of the findings are performed with three different ways 
of mobilization being introduced as result of the analysis. An outlook of the 
meaning of these results for the practice will close this study.  
1.3 Existing literature 
In the field of European interest representation, many empirical studies have been 
published (Bennet 1997, Greenwood et al 1992, Mazey and Richardson 1993, van 
Schendelen 2002). These studies on the diverse and complex field showed that the 
link between theoretical approaches and practice is lacking.  
Regional influence in Brussels gathered some academic interest with the 
following summary being significant but incomplete as well as literature regional 
influences in general. These works do not focus solely on regional offices but 
include them as one way of interest representation. Besides more general oriented 
studies in regional influence (Bomberg and Peterson 1998, Jerneck and Gidlund 
2001), a few on regional offices exist (Hooghe and Marks 1996, Marks et.al 
1996), mostly serving as an inventory rather than a real study. Some of these 
studies come to the conclusion that regional offices have a rather weak influence, 
depending on their home country (Marks et al 2002).  Others argue that the 
regional office influence is underestimated and regions have the opportunity to 
become relevant players (Tatham 2008, Moore 2008). Some see them as a form of 
collective action in which history and the country are important factors for 
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opening an office (Nielsen and Salk 1998: 247). There are works on offices of 
single countries, preferably Germany and Great Britain that come to the 
conclusion that the German offices get involved and influence the European 
policy process (Bosselmann 2007: 75) or see a shift towards more regionalism 
(Burch and Gomez 2002). Lastly, there are comparative studies of offices. Even 
within German, British and Spanish offices there are differing influences (Jeffery 
2000, Jeffery 1997) and organizational forms. These different political structures 
of Germany, France and Spain have a huge influence on the performance of 
offices in Brussels, with the German Länder having the biggest influence 
(Neunreither 2001). Other works focus on two German regions (Buchheim 2002) 
but it is questionable if the results can be generalized towards other regions, 
especially outside of Germany. 
Despite various studies, they can only partly be used within the discourse 
itself. Firstly, they focus not solely on regional offices but on all channels of 
influence. Secondly, they analyze all the duties performed by the regional offices; 
not just lobbying functions. They focus outside of the BSR, mainly German, 
English and Spanish regions are of interest (Kohler-Koch 1995, Mazey 1995, 
Moore 2005, Tatham 2007, Burch and Gomez 2002, Bomberg and Peterson 
1998). Except Germany, no other region of the BSR has gathered major individual 
interest3. Within this study the regional offices of the BSR as a macro- region will 
be focused upon. Since the study concentrates solely on lobbying, it is unique 
within the studies of regional offices.  
1.4 Methods 
Focusing on the BSS, the study is a single embedded case study which tries to 
explain the mobilization of the offices in Brussels. This was chosen because with 
its characteristics it serves as an excellent research object. Firstly, it is highly 
related to regional interest and includes a wide range of topics. Secondly, it is a 
major step into a new direction of a new regional policy and thirdly, within its 
developing process it is very open for reformation. The multiple units within the 
embedded study of analysis (Ying 2003: 40) is divided into the regional offices 
and the EC. The focus lies on the influence of the regional offices with the 
Commission serving as a verification or rating actor. Every case study includes 
questions (Yin 2003: 74) and they are asked in the form of hypotheses. The 
developing and explanation of these hypotheses will be done within the first part 
of the thesis, then applied directly to the case study within the second part.  
The empirical data was carried out through expert interviews, chosen from the 
wide range of possible interview methods. Expert interview is done with a 
“person who is responsible for the development, implementation or control of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3
 Besides the already mentioned study by Jerneck and Gidlund (2001) and an unpublished paper 
that focuses on Estonia and Finland. 
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solutions/strategies/policies and who has privileged access to information about 
groups of persons or decision processes” (Meuser and Nagel 2002:71ff). 
When recruiting the experts of the study, a short interview request was sent to 
31 regional offices in Brussels in addition to several decision making institutions, 
accompanied with a short description of the research project. With 12 offices and 
two Commission officials an interview could be scheduled. The participants are a 
cross section of the offices of the BSR in Brussels and can therefore represent the 
region. This is essential for the question of generalization of the study. The study 
was conducted with regard to ethical guidelines in social science research (Kvale 
and Brinkmann 2009: 68ff) and research participants were informed about the 
overall purpose of the study and the main features of its design. They were briefed 
about confidentiality and the study’s application. All interviews with one 
exemption were taped and were made anonymous due to the sensitiveness of the 
issue. Quotes were adjusted that no inference of the identity of the office can be 
revealed. Questions asked were oriented on the study’s theoretical outline and the 
same question roughly repeated to all participants. An interview guide was used 
and adjusted to specify mentioned aspects and deepen them. Afterwards a 
postscript was created followed by transcribing. With interviewing the 
“interpretation of the data is at the core of qualitative research” (Flick 2006: 295) 
and the analysis took place focusing on the meaning of words and not the manner 
in which they were said. All data was verified during and after the study.  
The overall requirement is objectivity and reliability. Reliability pertains the 
consistency and trustworthiness of research findings. In interviews this is closely 
connected on how the questions will be asked. The same interview guide was used 
for every single interview and differences within the interviewees can be 
excluded. Furthermore, the questions within this guideline were open and non- 
biased or non-influential. Validity permeates the whole research process not just 
one single aspect of the process and includes the trustworthiness of the interview 
subjects, the transcribing style or the logic of interpretation used. Every effort was 
done to produce valid and objective data throughout. 
1.5 Limitations 
The study has certain limitations. Firstly, all the findings are based on a single 
case study. Ying states “the single case study can represent a significant 
contribution to knowledge and theory building” (Yin 2003: 40) but this could be a 
disadvantage as well. Nonetheless, this study can to a certain extend be 
generalized. Stake states that findings should not be solely generalized but rather 
seen contextually and thus be transferred to other situations (Stake 2005). The 
case study should therefore offer a ‘naturalistic generalization’ which does not 
include any claims about general meaning of their outcomes (Gomm et al. 
2000:3ff) but that the study can produce a more detailed picture on regional 
lobbying. 
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Choosing interviews as the main method could install a problem since “it is 
hard to produce new knowledge through interviews that goes beyond common 
sense and which may be pragmatically helpful in understanding or even changing 
a social situation” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 299). However, its strength to 
produce an insight view into regional lobbying in Brussels is clear. Interviews are 
highly related to the honesty of the interview partners, which is closely connected 
to reliability and therefore, complete credibility cannot be reached with the study. 
Another limitation could be the choice of participants. As aforementioned, the 
interested offices show quite a good sample of all offices in Brussels of the BSR. 
For the most representative result, all regional offices and institutions need to be 
interviewed which was considered when analyzing the results. 
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2 Lobbying and Mobilization  
2.1 Lobbying 
The lobby was a venue where the congressman and delegates could debate and 
bargain with outsiders. From the early 19th century the expression ‘lobbyists’ was 
used for the people that tried to influence the congressman.  
One recent definition was that of Milbrath defining a competition of two 
people trying to attract the favor of the decision makers (Milbrath 1963). Berry 
moves away from the two-person explanation and focuses upon the lobbyist as an 
person that wants to have influence on a political decision (Berry 1977: 46). In 
recent years scholars followed this active approach defining lobbying simply as 
‘efforts to influence political decision making’ (Cates 1988: 238ff, Jordan 1991). 
This is used too loosely and sometimes even inappropriately, therefore another 
definition is used here.  
EU institutions are quite open for input from interest groups and sometimes even 
rely on this input (Mazey and Richardson 1993). Some authors argue that the “EU 
institutional setting and the interest group system co-evolved” (Eising 2008: 9).  
The word lobbying is not unvalued but sometimes arises suspicion with a 
negative connotation. This derives from the “belief that lobbyists use improper 
methods in their attempts to influence officials” (Milbrath in Sills 1991: 442). In 
Europe especially this distrust is bigger than the United States and was seen as a 
‘threat’ towards democracy (Eschenburg 1950). Some scholars and actors prefer 
the word interest representation (Greenwood 2007). In terms of definition, it 
refers to the same action as lobbying. In this study, lobbying is the preferred term. 
The dismissive connotation also arose within the empirical study. “The expression 
lobbying is negative, rather networking” . The used notion ‘networks’ or 
‘networking’ is another expression frequently used inappropriately. In political 
science, extensive studies exist that deal with the concept of policy networks4. In 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4
 Börzel (1997) has presented a very good introduction as well as analysis of policy networks. 
Lobbying is “the stimulation and transmission of a communication, by 
someone other than a citizen acting on his own behalf, directed to a 
governmental decision maker with the hope of influencing his decision” 
(Milbrath in Sills 1991: 442).  
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line with these concepts this work refers to organizational networks when 
mentioning the notion5. When referring to building up relationships over time the 
expression ‘contacts’ is used not to interfere these two different acts.  
2.2 Mobilization 
The notion mobilization plays a major role within this study. Regional 
mobilization is defined as “the growing engagement of sub-national governmental 
actors with the institutions and processes of EU policy-making.” (Jeffery 2000: 2). 
Jeffery refers to mobilization on the whole regional level, this paper has to define 
a slightly more narrowed definition. Since it only concentrates on the regional 
offices in Brussels, which is a mobilization per se, the focus is on how they 
mobilize and perform the influence and what variables are responsible for the 
mobilization process. It is therefore closely related to the lobbying notion 
explained above but nonetheless goes beyond the sheer influence measurement.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5
 This can be for example in the BSR the ‘BaltMet’ or ‘B7’ networks. 
The definition of mobilization of the regional offices in Brussels is 
the engagement of the offices within the institutions and processes 
of  EU policy making. 
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3 The Regional Offices 
Referring to a regional office always implies referring to the region that is 
represented. In the past many different definitions have been made on the issue6. 
This paper follows the understanding of Gren which states that a regions is 
“defined as a territorial unit […] and acting as a framework for economic and 
political action.” (Gren 1999: 12). That implies that the region does not 
necessarily need a common institutional government and is in line with the 
different areas the regional offices in the study represent, since they do not 
essentially have a regional elected body7. In this respect, a regional office is an 
office of a region lower than nation-state level that represents this area towards 
the outside. The study does not include the national representations of regions and 
municipalities. Firstly, they don’t see themselves as regional offices and they 
“have a slightly different role than the regional offices.”  Secondly, they have a 
different outline and represent the regions of a nation state level, not the regions 
itself. Regardless, these organisations work closely together with the regional 
offices as they are defined in the study, this makes that some scholars count them 
as regional offices (Hooghe and Marks 1996: 83). 
3.1 The Development of the Offices 
The past two decades has seen an explosion in the number of offices 
established by sub-national governments in Brussels. Despite their continued 
growth and financial empowerment, many academics still question the influence 
and therefore the usefulness of these offices (Hooghe and Marks 1996, Bomberg 
and Peterson 1998, Jeffery 2000 and Marks et al. 2002). Nonetheless it is “a 
truism that no rational actor will ever waste resources by investing in an operation 
that does not deliver any form of a return” (Moore 2008: 522).  
The legal situation of the offices is very different. They vary from legal 
entities under the law of the national state or under the name of an NGO and their 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6
 For a summary of different notions and definitions of ‘region’ see Gren (1999: 11ff) who has a 
short, but good summary of the ongoing discussion. The EU has its own definition of a region 
which is the so called NUTS system. This is part of the definition but not the used definition in this 
paper.  
7
 With this definition also the BSR is included and defined. The region is a macro-region of the 9 
countries with access to the Baltic Sea, in some definitions also Norway and Iceland is included. In 
this study BSR refers to the first. 
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organization is as various as their legal status. Hence, they differ from the work of 
the PermReps of the countries as they try to gather information and influence the 
policies as early as possible whereas the latter is focusing on the work within the 
Council (Bosselmann 2007: 25). The first offices opened in Brussels were the 
German Länder8, which are mostly seen as the forerunner of regional influence. 
Today about 300 offices are set in Brussels from nearly every member state. “The 
action for sub-national offices is rooted in their respective domestic polities where 
we find sub-national governments operating alongside –and sometimes against– 
national governments to increase their resources to gain greater political 
autonomy, or to avoid being outflanked by the imposition of EU policies that 
national governments have bargained over their heads” (Marks et al. 2002: 15). 
Initially installed as an early warning establishment, they have nowadays various 
tasks: 
 (after Bosselmann 2007: 23ff/ 52ff, Marks et al 2002,  Moore 2009) 
 
Over the years they became more and more lobbying facilities, especially when 
the offices got upgraded with staff and competencies. This is connected to the fact 
that lobbying follows information gathering, since the domestic level needs to be 
well informed to position themselves.  
3.2 The Regional Offices as Lobbying Actors 
It is evident that regional offices act as lobbying facilitators. “Translated into the 
terms of interest-group politics, regional offices 'lobby' those in power, although 
administrators of regional offices usually describe their activities in more 
bureaucratically acceptable language” (Marks et.al.1996: 183). Lobbying is 
usually divided into two different groups, the ‘sovereign’ and the ‘non-sovereign’ 
(Buchheimer 2002: 29). Other scholars divide into ‘public’ and ‘private’ lobbying. 
(Michalowitz 2007: 52, Fischer 1997: 35ff). The regional offices are clearly set at 
the ‘sovereign’ or ‘public’ level, which leads to the fact that they have “privileged 
access” (Eising 2008: 9). This is related to their special stance. “most EU 
legislation involves local and regional governments in its implementation, and has 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8
 Their existence is secured and their duties as well as restrictions are defined in detail under §8 
EUZBLG http://bundesrecht.juris.de/euzblg/__8.html 
 
• Information Gathering 
• Acquisition of Subsidies/ Contacts with other Regions 
• Representing the Region at the European Level 
• Representing the Office in the Region 
• Supporting the CoR Members of the Region 
• Lobbying 
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thus engendered a set of active regional players seeking to shape that legislation” 
(Greenwood 2007: 231). Emergent practices of policy initiation and development 
in the EU sphere draw on the weight of regional expertise situated in and around 
the key institutions (Mazey and Richardson, 2001: 78). Studies showed that the 
main focus lies on the Commission “in their battles with member states and as 
agents of implementation” (Greenwood 2007: 176). The problem within regional 
lobbying can be that “regional representatives misunderstanding the nature of 
authority structures in EU regional policy making and investing lobbying efforts 
in the wrong targets (John and McAteer 1998). Furthermore, they should pursue 
their interest as if it is the common interest of the regional level (Bosselmann 
2007:52). The sheer number of regional offices equate to balancing the reasons 
for contacting the Commission. “Contacting because of any issue might not help 
in promoting the issue” (Buchheim 2002: 187). 
3.3 The Offices in the Study 
The concentration on the BSR and the offices based in Brussels represent a wide 
variety; in total there are 32 offices with a direct connection to the Baltic Sea9. 
Some of these offices are bigger, others smaller, but the offices of the BSR can be 
seen as an representative cross section of all existing offices in Brussels. The 
offices embrace a certain diversity. Some of them are units of federal ministries 
with civil servants, others represent city or local authorities whilst others represent 
regional and sub- regional alliances. Of these offices, 10 took part in the study  
representing these different forms. Within the analysis the study will return to 
these differentiations.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9
 Which only includes offices with a direct access or connection to the Baltic Sea, usually the 
broader number of about 55 in terms of the wider definition of the BSR including more parts of 
Germany, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Poland and Norway is named.  
 11 
4 The Baltic Sea Strategy 
4.1 The Development of the Baltic Sea Strategy 
The uniqueness of the BSR gathers the attention of the European Union for almost 
15 years. After the 2004 enlargement, the potential and challenges of the Baltic 
Sea Region has been paid further attention. With the BSS, for the first time in 
history the Union creates an internal EU strategy for a specific geographic macro-
region. The European Union is interestingly preparing a transnational area for co-
operation but without “using this term according to the treaties” (Schymik and 
Krumrey 2009: 2). The idea behind the Baltic Sea strategy is to create a 
surrounding that will make it easier for the region to prosper, and to handle its 
cross-border challenges more effectively.  
The idea of a Baltic Sea Strategy was first raised in November 2005 by the 
inter-parliamentarian ‘Europe Baltic Intergroup’ when they published a paper 
called ‘Europe’s strategy for the Baltic Sea region’. After a while of silence the 
Council states within its conclusions of the December 14th 2007 summit: 
 
 
Today, the Commission is working on the strategy. According to the Commission 
officials the strategy is “very important for at least 5 DG’s”  and a “priority”  for 
DG Regio. Openness is one of the main priorities within drafting the strategy with 
two ways of consultation processes. The first was a series of meetings, a 
stakeholder conference last September in Stockholm opened the consultation 
process. On this account the Commission published a paper and identified the 
rough direction of the strategy with four different focus areas: environment, 
economy, infrastructure and safety. In the following months for each of these 
topics a ‘round table’ meeting was placed. The consultation process was 
completed with another stakeholder meeting in Rostock on February 2009 and in 
light of this meeting the Commission published its first proposal for the draft of 
the BSS. The second process was an public consultation for two months where 
citizens, organizations and public authorities could submit ideas which ended in 
“Without prejudice to the integrated maritime policy, the European Council invites 
the Commission to present an EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region at the latest by 
June 2009. This strategy should inter alia help to address the urgent environmental 
challenges related to the Baltic Sea. The Northern Dimension framework provides the 
basis for the external aspects of cooperation in the Baltic Sea region."  
(European Council 2007) 
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December. In this second process 110 papers reached the Commission (Schymik 
and Krumrey 2009: 5). With these papers the Commission “decided on a 
analytical basis what is interesting and what we could exploit further” . In June 
2009 the final draft will be presented at the Council meeting and the strategy will 
become one of the priorities during the upcoming Swedish presidency in the 
second half of 2009. It is clear the Commission aims for a so called ‘rolling action 
plan’, which is without time limitations and therefore needs to be updated 
frequently. (Schymik and Krumrey: 9). The strategy itself will be adopted as a 
Communication and it will be short with an action plan as annex. The action plan 
will appear to be “broad, complex and little focused” (Schymik and Krumrey 
2009: 2). The Commission explains: “we list some actions showing where we 
want to go and then we are listing more concrete with a number of reflection 
projects that should be implemented”.  
4.2 Bodies Dealing with the Baltic Sea Strategy 
4.2.1 The European Commission 
The Baltic Sea Strategy is written under supervision of DG Regio and here the 
unit of territorial co-operation. The team working on the BSS consists out of four 
people, including the head of the unit with each person assigned a chapter as the 
main writer. This group meets once a day, mainly informal and comments on the 
work which they describe as “very intense and collaborative effort” . In addition 
they are supported by several other staff members on certain issues. An impact 
assessment group exists and contacts with all units of the countries involved all 
from DG region are frequent. This includes regular meetings with the Director of 
the DG and the Commissioner. Core groups of DG Regio, DG Environment, DG 
Maritime and DG Relex exist since “any of the DG’s could be the one that was 
leading” . Besides these core groups, an inter-service working group composed of 
20 DG’s supports DG Regio. These get asked “to provide information, they also 
look at the strategy drafts and comment on them and they also push for things to 
be included”  and “if we don’t agree it has to be sorted out at the higher level”.  
Besides these internal collaborations, the Commission has also invited input 
from outside; mainly through the public consultation process but also from other 
meetings and contacts. “DG Regio was quite open and really invited to have input 
from all the different regions and the different regional levels and the networks.”  
This openness is primarily done because of the lack of expertise. “The small size 
of the Commission relative to its function can makes it dependent upon expertise 
that outside interests bring for drafting workable and technically feasible policy 
proposals.” (Greenwood 2007: 7). This makes an easy access from lobbying 
efforts. “It is therefore not surprising that a significant resource dependency 
between officials and lobbyists based on regulatory needs, expertise, information 
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and reputation has emerged in the European public policy process” (Coen 2007: 
334). However, DG Regio stressed the importance of their supervision “We are in 
the end the ones that are writing. We in the end need to make the analysis if it fits 
into the bigger picture of the strategy and decide if its worth to take it on board.” . 
It is most likely that lobbying activities are mainly focused on DG Regio, 
which juxtaposes the general experience of lobbying since, as the agenda setter, 
the Commission is the primary focus of lobbying activities (Pollack 2003). This is 
confirmed by studies on regional offices (Bosselmann 2007: 29) and relates to the 
fact that offices try to influence as early as possible and the Commission is usually 
the starting point of all EU decisions.  
4.2.2 The European Council 
The European Council was the institution that decided about the existence of the 
BSS and gave the mandate to the Commission to prepare a draft of the strategy. 
The main driver within the member states is undoubtedly Sweden, since it pushed 
for the strategy on the ministerial session of the CBSS in June 2007 (KalniĦšā 
2008: 1) and managed to include the sentence within the Council conclusion in 
December of the same year. The plan is that the formal adoption of the strategy 
and with it an action plan will be done by the Council meeting in December this 
year. The Council is therefore the main decision making body within the process 
of the strategy. Since this paper focuses on the influence of the regional offices it 
appears most likely that the Council does not play a major role. The main direct 
contact of the regional offices is primarily done through the PermRep’s of the 
member states. The study therefore focuses only on these relations, if there are 
any. 
4.2.3 The European Parliament 
As aforementioned, the Parliament played an important initial role. The informal 
EBIG of the Parliament was the one that initially launched the idea of an Baltic 
Sea Strategy10. Informal groups in the parliament are special in the respect that 
their work is not compulsive and they execute quasi lobbying activities (Judge and 
Earnshaw 2003: 198). This informal group included MEP’s of eight Baltic Sea 
EU Member States and several MEP’s with other nationalities. The chairmanship 
is held by British MEP Christopher Beazley and they try to promote the regions 
interest within the Parliament. Seven members of the Baltic Strategy Working 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
10
 Although the initiative of the Northern Dimension as a policy framework for Northern Europe 
and its partner countries in the region exists. Initially launched in 1997 and after two action plans 
the strategy was re-launched in 2007 and is now an infinite framework that should enhance co-
operation in all fields within the region.  
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Group, one of them being today’s Finnish Foreign minister Alexander Stubb, 
wrote a paper called ‘Europe’s strategy for the Baltic Sea Region” which was 
presented to the EC president in November 2005, initially written to highlight the 
issue for the then upcoming presidencies of Germany and Finland. After Sweden 
discovered the topic and the Commission’s involvement, the EBIG is constantly 
following the process and members of the intergroup are welcomed speakers on 
all occasions in relation with the BSR. However, at the moment the Parliament is 
not involved in any decision making process. It is most likely that once the 
Commission has delivered the Communication to the Council and the first reading 
is held, the Parliament is having a resolution on the topic. Despite its powers and 
openness, the Parliament is not the main addressee of lobbying activities by the 
offices (Buchheimer 2002: 32).  
4.2.4 Committee of the Regions 
The CoR has rather limited competences in the decision making process and 
serves mainly as an assembly of regional representatives. In principal the CoR 
possesses only a advisory status (art. 263 EC), but depending on the policy fields 
it has to be consulted. In classical terms the CoR is therefore a lobbying institution 
itself (Buchheimer 2002: 33). Since the BSS is unique in its character and is about 
to address a European macro- region for the first time, the CoR is most likely to 
have some input within the decision making process. So far the body has 
published two papers, first in April 2008 which serves as an appreciation and wish 
list at the same time. The second more concrete opinion called ‘The role of local 
and regional authorities within the new Baltic Sea Strategy’ was adopted in April 
2009 under the supervision of the Informal Baltic Sea Group of the CoR with the 
rapporteur being an representative of a Swedish region. This group will follow the 
process of the Baltic Sea Strategy. The regional offices have to some extent 
institutionalised their lobbying efforts on the CoR since they usually help their 
members with the preparations of the Committees sessions (Bosselmann 2002: 
33).  
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5 The Theoretical Framework 
5.1 The Theoretical Design 
5.1.1 Theoretical Approaches towards Lobbying 
The classical theoretical approaches can only partly explain lobbying. There are 
the state-centric models, the supra-national models and the multi-governance 
approaches. Out of these the latter one is the one that tries to explain the 
coexistence of political processes (for a detailed summary of the general theories 
towards lobbying see Appendix C). The idea behind this is that political authority 
is divided between European and national authorities and therefore domestic 
groups need to pursue their interest via several routes, a national and a European 
one (Hooghe and Marks 2001). Member states are not the only link between the 
European level and the regional authorities. “MLG theorists posit a set of 
overarching, multilevel policy networks” (Marks et. al. 1996: 167). This model is 
a good theoretical background when it comes to explain the mobilization of 
regions on European level but not how their mobilization works, which is the 
main intention of this study. Therefore this model cannot be further used within 
the development of the theoretical framework. 
EU interest group studies have been shaped by various different fields of 
political science namely comparative politics, international relations, policy 
analysis and democratic theory (Eising 2008: 1). Thus, it is not easy to define one 
single theoretical approach to explore the field. The models and theories within 
the field of political science are mostly interaction models that have to look on 
‘both sides of the game’ of the lobbying interaction. What complicates this further 
is that most interest groups differ considerably and have no relations except 
promoting their interest.  
5.1.2 Developing of the Theoretical Framework 
As pointed out, with the usually theories used in the field, the mobilization of 
regional offices and their lobbying behavior cannot be explained, therefore 
theories from other fields need to be considered. More than one theoretical 
approach has been followed to build and develop this theoretical framework with 
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having have their background in various different political areas. Diplomacy 
theory was used as the main theoretical approach since the regional offices can be 
seen as diplomatic mission of the regions. Theories from diplomacy can be 
applied almost directly to the work of the regional offices when it comes to 
interest representation. Diplomacy is mainly defined as foreign policies of 
countries, or in a more general definition it is “a method of political interaction at 
the international level and the techniques used to carry out political relations 
across international boundaries” (Leguey-Feilleux 2009:1). This presents a basis 
to understand the work, interaction and function of a regional office in Brussels. 
The regional offices can be seen as little ‘embassies’ of their region within the 
European landscape. Negotiation theory is closely connected to diplomacy and 
plays another major role within the theoretical framework. “Negotiation is widely 
regarded as one of the major functions of diplomacy” (Leguey-Feilleux 2009:4) 
which makes it easy to juxtapose.  
In the following theoretical framework, a model of different lobbying 
strategies will first be presented. Different variables that might determine the use 
of these strategies will then be explained “Existing literature on lobbying suggests 
that an interest group makes strategic lobbying choices based on its available, 
resources, its lobbying target, the characteristics of the issue, and the 
characteristics of other groups” (Victor 2007: 827). The variables are divided into 
two different sets: the topic itself and the office. This distinction is necessary to 
understand if some issues of mobilization are only connected to the BSS or if it 
can be seen as a general course. The topic variables are clearly connected to the 
BSS and can explain the mobilization in that certain case. The office variables can 
be generalized since within negotiation ‘organization theory’ (Kolb and Faure 
1994) exists which is referring to how structures affect negotiations in general. 
“All organizations develop informal structures, a set of norms and taken-for-
granted understandings about how decisions are made and work gets done, which 
complement (and sometimes modify) formal structures” (Kolb and Faure 1994: 
114).  
The variables from the both sets should explain if mobilization has an impact 
on the strategy of the offices, each assigned with a hypothesis. These variables 
will then be tested within the empirical part and the hypothesis will therefore be 
verified or falsified. The main assumption that combines all these different 
variables is the hypothesis that ‘mobilization matters’. 
5.1.3 Limitations of the Theoretical Framework 
Although these different approaches can explain the general complex situation, 
every single theoretical part has its limitations as well. Within diplomacy most 
approaches are substantialist rather than relationalist. Therefore there is no 
complete theoretical approach towards diplomacy. Negotiation theory has its 
limitations because it can explain certain decisions only partly since “negotiation 
require some special skills. These come through an acquired ‘feel of things’ and 
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are beyond capture and transmission of rules and theories” (Zartman and Berman 
1982: 1).  
The theoretical framework is based on different aspects of different 
approaches which might be seen as theoretical omnium-gatherum and therefore 
not accurate and precise. Nonetheless only a mix of these different approaches can 
explain the picture as a whole since this evokes that the theoretical focus is not 
just on a single theoretical corner neglecting another one but explains the general 
view. It must be mentioned that no meta-theory should be created. The 
development of the theoretical framework is solely used as an approach to explain 
and analyze the access and impact of the regional offices in this case and is 
mainly based on assumptions. 
Lastly, the theoretical framework focuses on the input made by the offices. 
The output can only be mentioned briefly within the different goods of access. An 
extensive and complete analysis of this cannot be done as it is simply too 
elaborative and when writing this paper the strategy was not published. Therefore 
this output-analysis cannot be done. 
 
 
5.2 The Lobbying Strategies  
To explain the lobbying strategy, differentiations were used after Farnel (ibid. 
1994: 107ff). The choice for the strategy model below was made because it is 
simple and applicable to the regional offices11. Mainly three different strategies 
can be taken by the offices: The active position, the passive position and the 
anticipating position, whereas to the active position several different tactics can be 
applied. 
5.2.1 The Active Position 
The active position in contrast to the passive position implies that actions are 
taken. With these actions the actor tries to influence the lobbying object in a way 
that it suits the interest of the region. These actions or tactics can be done with 
different ways, mainly direct lobbying, indirect lobbying, financial lobbying and 
coalitions (Farnel 1994: 114ff).  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11
 For more detailed reasons what strategy to choose (mostly related to the private sector) and why see Farnel 
(1994) 
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5.2.1.1. Direct Lobbying 
Direct Lobbying, also sometimes called ‘insider lobbying’ is characterized as 
“close consultation with political and administrative leaders, relying mainly on 
financial resources, substantive expertise, and concentration within certain 
congressional constituencies as a basis for influence” (Gais and Walker 1991: 
103). This is connected to the definition of a target group, which will be discussed 
within the mobilization variables. Direct lobbying happens mainly through 
communication and direct contacts with the addressees, which can be done 
through official and informal meetings, briefings, written communication or 
phone calls and is closely connected to financial lobbying (Berry 1997). 
5.2.1.2. Indirect Lobbying 
Besides direct lobbying, indirect or sometimes called grassroots lobbying exists as 
a tactic. This usually aims to bring more widespread attention to the lobbying 
cause (Gais and Walker 1991) and aims to influence the general perception of the 
lobbying object. Usually this means a more widespread lobbying with actions in 
the public relations sector, but in this special case the indirect lobbying behavior is 
less public oriented. Here it refers to the actions that are not taken directly from 
the regional offices but from another person, with the offices working closely 
together. This might be the home region itself, but also other networks from the 
BSR, which try to influence the BSS, since addressees cannot tell how much and 
if any input of these lobbying advances are made by the regional offices.  
5.2.1.3. Financial Lobbying 
The third tactic is financial lobbying and this can be done either legitimately or 
unethically (Farnel 1994: 116). The legitimate form is when the lobbying actor 
helps and supports the addressee with campaigns and/or with the provision of 
financial resources, including human resources. Conversely, unethical tactics also 
exist through bribes or other techniques. It is unlikely unethical tactics have been 
used, no office and/or the Commission would admit the use within the study. 
5.2.1.4. Coalition 
Coalition building is another lobbying tactic and this will be discussed more in 
detail since it is also used quite frequently in negotiation theory. According to this 
theory, a coalition is necessary if “in acting to reach their ends, they make rational 
decisions as to their options– their choices of requisite means. One such means 
may involve the forming of political coalitions with other groups” (Strauss 1978: 
71/72). Coalition theory is based on three aspects: formation, stability and 
duration as well as impact and outcomes (Dupont 1994: 149). The first two 
aspects are of main interest of this study – why it might emerge and if it changed 
over time. The motivations to build a coalition can be manifold: Firstly, to 
improve the stand outside of the coalition to gain power because of little resources 
or plain bargaining behavior, or because of inside dimensions to gain power 
within the coalition or equity (Dupont 1994: 150). In combination with 
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negotiation theory, ‘small group theory’ (Rubin and Swap 1994) explains how 
groups form themselves within or prior to negotiation. It can be formed as a 
blocking coalition, deviation or to confirm pressure. The importance and success 
of the group relies on certain aspects: “the group’s leadership, membership 
composition, history or cohesiveness” (Rubin and Swap 1994: 136). A common 
history or prior contacts may help when forming these groups. “Group whose 
members have a history of working together (and who may anticipate doing so in 
future) are likely to be more effective than those that do not have such a history” 
(Rubin and Swap 1994: 136). More homogenous groups tend to perform better 
than diverse groups and “groups whose members are united in some common 
purpose or who have a strong esprit de corps are more likely to work effectively 
then less cohesive groups” (Rubin and Swap 1994: 136). Leadership might be of 
importance within in these groups.12  
Previous studies have pointed out that “successful lobbying of the 
Commission meant establishing an organizational capacity to coordinate potential 
ad-hoc political alliances” (Mahoney 2007). Nonetheless, it has to be kept in mind 
that on many issues sub-national governments are intensely competitive. When it 
comes to funding opportunities or access they are in competition (Hooghe and 
Marks 1996: 86) which makes it interesting to see if an coalition emerges. 
5.2.2 The Passive Position 
The passive position is characterized by observing rather than acting. No action is 
taken but that does not necessarily mean that no lobbying is happening. The 
lobbyist in that case takes the role of an observer and in case he will take action 
this will happen when the final decision is taken on the decision making level. 
Even if no action is taken this is a clear lobbying sign since it is taken from 
diplomacy, with also nonverbal communication having an impact, like “personal 
gestures” (Jönsson and Hall 2005: 84). Every gesture or action made by the office 
sends messages towards other offices as well as to the Commission and 
institutions. Non-behavior can also send messages and is therefore crucial for 
interest representation. This aspect is hard to study since not every movement can 
be observed. When an actor decides to take the passive position, this can also be 
connected to his lack of mobilization skills and hence its inclusion in the study. 
5.2.3 The Anticipating Position 
Additionally, the anticipating position can be distinguished. This is a mixture out 
of passive position and the passive action. It is characterized when the lobbying 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
12
 Leadership is connected to certain skills, efforts and common norms and beliefs that exist to accept a 
leader. For more on leadership (in the European Union) see Tallberg (2006). 
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actor tries to keep eventual bad effects in control but does not try to influence the 
action in a way that it would suit the actor best. It is a ‘wait and see’ action but 
‘interact if necessary’ action.  
5.3 The Perception of the Strategies 
To measure the outcome, many factors need to be considered that are closely 
linked to a behavioral models and explains why, within the drafting, several inputs 
were taken up and why others were dropped13. In this study only the question of 
access can be discussed. Without access, influence and/or lobbying cannot be 
achieved. “Access therefore becomes the facilitating intermediate objective of 
political interest groups. The development and improvement of such access is a 
common denominator of the tactics of all of them” (Trueman 1951: 264). Bouwen 
points out three access goods for interest groups representation. These are ‘expert 
knowledge’, ‘information about the European encompassing interest’ and the 
‘domestic encompassing interest’ (Bouwen 2002: 369ff). The first one has been 
mentioned frequently within theoretical frameworks (Truman 1951, Van 
Schendelen 1994, Bulholzer 1998), the two latter are first mentioned by Bouwen. 
‘Expert knowledge is usually needed within the first phase of policy making 
because drafting proposals requires an “substantial amount of expert knowledge” 
(Bouwen 2002: 379) which is highly related to the Commissions design. “Because 
of understaffing and severe budget constrains in the Commission, the institution is 
dependent on external resources to obtain the necessary expertise” (Spence 1997) 
As Bouwen states in the early stages, the two other goods do not play an 
important role, although the Member of the European parliament are highly 
concerned with the ‘domestic encompassing interest’(ebd. 2002: 379). These 
goods are crucial to gain access to the institutions to lobby. As aforesaid, the 
process of drafting the BSS was quite open, but it matters if the offices have the 
goods to offer what the Commission is asking. If this is not the case the lobbying 
efforts do not have much success and the mobilization processes of the offices 
should produce these goods. Therefore, not only is the access important, but the 
efficiency that is made out of access is crucial for the impact of the offices. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
13
 an extensive study on effectiveness including several behavioural models can be found at 
Jaatinen (1999). 
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5.4 The Variables of Mobilization 
5.4.1 First Set of Variables: The Case 
5.4.1.1. The Importance of the Topic 
 
 
The importance of the topic for the region must be regarded when it comes to the 
question of why some offices might be more interested in lobbying and others are 
not. The BSS is expected to have an impact on all regions with the Baltic Sea 
Area, though some might not see the importance to their own regions or might 
solely not be interested in interest representation. If offices see the Baltic Sea 
Strategy as an crucial policy area of their interest they are most likely more 
interested in giving their input.  
5.4.1.2. Channels of Influence 
 
 
As pointed out, there are different actors dealing with the BSS, therefore they 
might have different channels of influence. In general, the big majority of scholars 
view the following actors as lobbying addressees: the parliament, governments, 
the bureaucracy, judiciary, parliamentary fractions and political parties (Karr 
2007: 68). Who the right channel is depends on the case. “Where possible, 
lobbyists try to influence such decision-makers that have direct access to decision-
making during the different phases of the policy process (Karr 2007: 68). This is 
closely linked to the decision making process which cannot carried out in detail14. 
In this case it is most likely that the regional offices have tried to influence the 
Commission officials (see 4.2.1.). As van Schendelen points out, the question 
within the channels of lobbying is not where the competencies are but where the 
‘work floor’ takes place, equating “the place where the work of decision making 
is really done” (ibid 2002). In the case of the BSS this is clearly at the unit of 
cross-border cooperation at DG Regio. Therefore it would be likely that most 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
14
 A detailed look on how the decision process in the European Union can be found at Peterson 
and Bomberg (1999) 
Hypothesis 1: ”It matters if the region is interested in the topic.” 
Hypothesis 2: “It matters what channels of influence the office has 
used.” 
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offices try to lobby here. The CoR might be another channel of influence the 
offices can use since it is ‘the’ main regional body of the EU15. The 
parliamentarians might play a role within lobbying as well. “MEPs can provide 
significant added-value to the case they present when they lobby either the 
Commission or their central executive” (Bomberg and Peterson 1998: 226). 
Therefore it is of interest what channels the offices have used.  
5.4.1.3. Time 
 
 
 “Time implies recognizing that any particular moment is situated in some sort of 
temporal context” (Pierson 2004: 167). It is therefore crucial when certain actions 
are taken and when certain decisions have been made. The time dimension 
variable is closely linked to the theory developed by Pierson on what influence it 
has on political issues and “offers essential analytical tools for investigating 
temporal processes” (Pierson 2004:9). When decisions have been made, it has an 
impact on an outcome. “Sequencing – the temporal order of events or processes- 
can be a crucial determinant of social outcomes” (Pierson 2004: 16). Pierson is 
referring to this as path dependency. “In institutionally dense environments, initial 
actions push individual behavior onto paths that are hard to reverse” (Pierson 
2004: 35). Path dependency relies on certain specific features i.e. that a range of 
outcomes is generally possible (multiple equilibria) that even small events, if they 
occur at the right moment can have a major output (contingency), or that it is 
crucial when an event occurs (timing and sequencing). Within the latter the phrase 
‘the earlier the better’ is applied because later actions might have no output, even 
though it its content might be of great importance to another time. He mentions 
additionally that timing cannot always be planned and that this has an impact on 
the outcomes. “When things happen effects how they happen” (Pierson 2004: 77). 
Although his study has the intention to explain several different impacts and key 
propositions on timing and sequence it is simply to extensive to regard every 
single aspect. The main focus lies on path dependence and issues of timing and 
sequence. The findings in respect to long- term, slow moving processes and 
institutional change will be neglected. 
Although this variable is not easy to measure, it has a close link to the self- 
determination variable since a long decision making process might have an 
negative impact on the time axis. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
15
 It has to be mentioned that the CoR has a double function: it represents the interest f the region 
towards the decision making bodies and it is an addressee of lobbyists as well. (Karr 2007: 67) 
Hypothesis 3: “It matters when the mobilization happened and when the 
lobbying actions were taken.” 
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5.4.2 Second Set of Variables: The Office 
5.4.2.1. Focus of the Office 
 
 
It might be the case that lobbying is not the main interest of the office. When it 
comes to regional offices, several studies have shown that information gathering 
is one of the main features (Marks et al. 1996:58, Jeffery 1996, Mitchell 1994, 
John 1994). Lobbying might therefore not be included in their given tasks. This is 
known from diplomacy: “gathering information on the local scene and reporting 
home has been recognized as one of the most important functions of the resident 
embassy” (Berridge 1995: 41). Acquiring information is important because 
“diplomacy is involved both in the formulation of a polity’s external policy and in 
its execution. Policy formulation requires the gathering and assessment of 
information about the external environment.” (Jönsson and Hall 2005: 73). 
Therefore, the most important aspect of an embassy is to “observe and report” 
(Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 194). Although with the evolving information society it 
might make this feature unnecessary, it is often argued that it is still important 
because “the information available via various media […] will remain significant 
complements to, but no substitute for, information gathered through diplomatic 
channels” (Jönsson and Hall 2005: 75). The person on the spot is still important 
because in diplomacy “it may take a discerning person to see what needs to be 
done differently to take advantage of technological advancements” (Leguey-
Feilleux 2009: 86). Other tasks attributed to the office was explained in 3.2. 
Henceforth the focus of the office determines its actions and the lobbying activity. 
5.4.2.2. Representation 
 
 
Representation questions what background the office has; whether it is a 
representation of an elected body or if it is autonomous from the regional political 
organization, which includes the difference between regional and local interests. 
Local equating cities, there is a difference in the power of offices representing a 
single region and ‘pluri-regional’ offices with the former usually being more 
powerful ones (Marks et al. 2002: 12). This is of interest since it would raise the 
question whether or not the elected bodies are more eligible and more vociferous 
within the various groups of lobbing. “The organizational form of interest 
Hypothesis 4: “It matters what focus the office has and what tasks are 
included in the daily work.” 
 
Hypothesis 5: “It matters whom the office represents and on what 
organizational form.” 
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representation […] is the crucial variable that determines the private interests’ 
capacity to supply access goods and thereby to gain access (Bouwen and 
McGown 2007: 425). Different organizational backgrounds can cause different 
outcomes. The most common hypothesis is that “the larger number of equal 
parties involved on a side, the more difficult it is to arrive at a position.” (Zartman 
and Berman 1982: 210) and therefore the efficiency of the work is likely to suffer. 
In case there are several actors at home and if the decisions that the Brussels 
office should cover are made at the home level, unity is necessary. Within 
negotiation this means that “decisions arrived in this way are obviously 
complicated and often time-consuming” (Zartman and Berman 1982: 207). Within 
negotiations it is “expected to speak with one voice” (Zartman and Berman 1982: 
206) and in interest representation the same can be applied. Within the principal-
agent theory, which refers to the relation between the representative and the 
represented (see 5.4.2.4), the difference between a single principal or multiple is 
obtained and points an advantage for the office in the case of several different 
decision makers at home. An increase in freedom of acting may occur since the 
different principal cannot agree on an instruction. It is therefore likely that the 
agent gets more leeway from the frequently vague commands of a collective 
body, where an agreement beforehand is necessary compared to a single actor that 
takes all the decisions by himself (Jönsson and Hall 2005: 109). It is questionable 
how this can effect the lobbying work positively. In addition, multiple principals 
can create difficulties for the negotiation or business partners of the agent because 
they cannot tell if their negotiation partner really acts as a representative for all of 
the principals.  
The “two-level-game theory” is a concept from negotiation that can be partly 
applied to this aspect. This concept developed by Putnam says that within 
negotiation there are always two levels the negotiator has to refer: the negotiation 
partner itself and the level at home, where extensive discussion might take place, 
consideration within the ongoing bargaining is needed (Putnam 1988). This 
involves another dimension of interest representation since “different authorities 
and audiences back home have to be satisfied, with a second level problem of 
fences, relations and interests” (Zartman and Berman 1982: 210). 
Another aspect of principal-agent theory refers to the question of who their 
‘real’ principal is, whether or not it is the government, individual ministers, their 
responsible office at home or maybe even the electorate (Jönsson and Hall 2005: 
109). This question can only be answered by the agents itself, but with whom they 
have employment contracts might be an indicator. 
In summary the art of representation might have a big impact on how the 
access and the influence can be done and that some organizational forms might 
have an advantage towards others. 
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5.4.2.3. Resources 
 
 
This variable contains a “resource push” (Marks at al. 1996) hypothesis. It stresses 
the importance of resources within lobbying and is based on the assumption that 
“the aggregation of resources (money and labor) is crucial to an understanding of 
social movement activity” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1216)16. Resources in that 
context include the material resources as well as the size of the office. “Resources 
such as policy information, financial means, constituency size, and economic 
cloud are import and prerequisites for both access and influence” (Eising 2008: 
15). There is a difference between direct and indirect resources. Direct resources 
can be used within the bargaining process like access goods. Indirect recourses are 
mainly related to personnel and organization which have effect the bargaining or 
lobbying process in an indirect ways. (Buholzer 1998). The more money, the 
bigger the office is a general assumption. Within previous studies, size turned out 
to be a major factor on how and what strategy the interest group chooses. 
“Material resources determine to a large degree the extent and kind of strategies 
that interests use” (Bouwen and McGown 2007: 425). Smaller offices are most 
likely to build on common actions to invest as less time and money as possible. 
Taken from the diplomacy experiences it is proven that a well operating office 
needs to be proper staffed. “Many international delegates are understaffed, lack 
the facilities to carry out their diplomatic relations, or cannot afford to pay for the 
normal cost of diplomatic representation” (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 140). If an 
office has more staff the delegates are supposed to be specialized within their 
topics. Taken from diplomatic experiences is shows that “diplomatic work thus 
requires greater specialized skill than before” (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 144). The 
size therefore matters because “the diversity of issues for which specialized 
preparation is deemed necessary” (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 69) and without the 
staff focusing on special issues the office tends not to be present within certain 
topics since no expertise is available. It must be noted that within diplomacy 
experts tend to act as specialists and within diplomacy experts from the ministry 
in the specific countries are sent to the embassies to serve as both an expert and an 
administrative delegate (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 186). Since the structures of the 
regional offices are to some extent different than the nation state level it is 
nonetheless questionable if this can be applied to the regional offices. A small 
office can be an advantage since unity is one of the most important factors within 
negotiations and a small office can less likely contradict itself with only a small 
amount of people, if only one, has contact with other actors, which is related to a 
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 The study itself is more related towards the social movements and resources as a ‘common 
good’. But nonetheless this can pave the way for the second variable. 
 
Hypothesis 6: “It matters how much resources the office has to its 
disposal.” 
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trust relationship (Zartman and Berman 1982 :206). Lobbying activities 
nonetheless demand a high personnel expenditure and therefore it is expected that 
offices with more resources at their disposal can mobilize their efforts better than 
less equipped offices. This is also closely connected to their ability to develop 
expertise and be experts within their subjects. (Bosselmann 2007: 54).  
5.4.2.4. Agenda Setting 
 
 
Of main concern here is how the selection of the interesting topics take place. It is 
crucial who makes the decision of which topics are on the agenda on the regional 
office and which ones are not. To explain this aspect the principal-agent theory 
(P-A theory) will be used. Principal-agent theory was developed to explain the 
relationship between represented (principal) and representatives (agent) and it 
arises always when one agent delegates certain tasks to another agent. Although 
originally designed for institutional economics it can applied to representation in 
general. People in the regional offices are actors that work on behalf of a 
principal, the region or more specific for an institution, organization or 
government at home. Rees develops this theory out of calculations of contracts 
between the principal and the agent. It might be the case that the actor is not 
pursuing the interest of the principal, what is called ‘shirking’ (Rees 1985: 78). If 
the concept is developed further for the purpose of diplomacy and interest 
representation the difference between acting for others (behavior) and standing for 
others (status) occurs (Jönsson and Hall 2005: 100). 
The first possibility of behavior would be carried out that the principal acts 
through the agent and gives instructions to him. Within this binding feature there 
are differences in how much the agents are bound to the decisions made by the 
principal and to what extend they are free to act within the interest of the 
principal. The first one can be called a “imperative mandate” whereas the second 
one would be a “free mandate” (Jönsson and Hall 2005: 101). The imperative 
mandate is closely linked to accountability which means that the representatives 
should act on explicit instructions and any action of shirking is unacceptable and 
the representation relationship is a sheer executive one. The free mandate in 
contrast refers to the agents work freely and authorization is the key term within 
this specification. They are seen as “free agents, trustees, or experts who are best 
left alone to do their work” (Pitkin 1972: 144). Certain problems can occur, the 
main being if the agent does not get clear advices or instructions from the 
principal. Another problem can be contradictory advices, which can be the case if 
many principals exist at home, which would most probably lead to inactivity and 
missed opportunities to react and represent their interest. The second main branch 
of representation, the status, refers to the way that the agent is replacing the 
principal. That means that the representative is completely free within his 
Hypothesis 7: “It matters where the agenda is set and to what 
extend the domestic level is interested in European issues.” 
 
 27 
decisions and that he is perceived as a “symbol” of the represented (Jönsson and 
Hall 2005: 115). It is most likely that the regional offices to not have this 
complete freedom and therefore it will not be further elaborated. 
Besides this actor and represented factor, it is proven from diplomacy issues 
that the home government is hard to convince and enthuse about certain topics 
that are seen as important within the embassy. “When the messages are sent but 
not read by their intended recipients, this situation tends to generate frustration 
and ironically even a sense of isolation.” (Legeux-Feilleux 2009: 189). This 
cannot only lead to important issues being missed but also that the influence of the 
office in certain issues is zero because the decision maker at home neglected the 
topic, of which the office was aware. The communication between both levels are 
expected to be crucial. The offices are usually not developing their own ideas but 
acting as the agent of the principal. (Bosselmann 2007: 55).  
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6 The Findings of the Case Study  
6.1 The Strategies of the Offices 
6.1.1 The Passive Position 
Since the passive position is defined as observation of the processes, three offices 
could be distinguished that chose this strategy. “I keep an eye on things. I have 
my eyes on the inside documents.” but there is no direct action. The reasons for 
these decisions are that they see the BSS as no value of interacting and were not 
interested to give any input. It has to be mentioned that all offices stressed the 
importance of the topic: that this can be no reason for not interacting. It is more 
the expectations from the offices that differ and therefore can cause or not cause 
interaction. It turned out that some offices have different priorities within their 
tasks and lobbying is not included in these. One office stated that they are not a 
lobbying office and instead focused on establishing project and funding in the 
region. “What we would like to get out of it, we follow the meetings and it is 
important to have the IBSG to have the networks. But we are more focused on the 
projects possibility” .  
6.1.2 The Active Position 
6.1.2.1. Direct Lobbying Strategy 
Most of the offices participating chose the direct lobbying strategy, which is 
characterized as personal communication. This action was mainly received as the 
main strategy of lobbying. “Meet as many people as possible, I think that is the 
way to do.”  The meetings took place either directly with the Brussels staff or 
members of their home organization. “We’ve done a little bit of wide lobbying on 
the side of what we are interested in and our politicians wanted a platform. Which 
is ok because we are further deepening and otherwise the lobbying is happening 
from the main organizations.”  It was mentioned that it is quite important to bring 
politicians to Brussels. “Especially here in Brussels they like politicians.”  It was 
also mentioned that the politicians from the home region cannot easily be 
 29 
mobilized to support the office in person. “They are not that keen but I force them 
every once in a while” . In some offices the BSS was a great exception. “Usually 
it is quite difficult to get them here but it has been really a major interest. People 
have been asking for it. For me it was really interesting and I had not drag them 
here.”  The meetings of politicians of the region are usually prepared by the 
Brussels offices and these are aware how important these meetings are “There are 
extremely lobbyist here. So I want to make it short when I am meeting them.”  
Some offices in addition were organizing meetings within the Consultation 
process whereas some took this opportunity to establish very close contact with 
the Commission while others did not got any advantage out of it  
6.1.2.2. Indirect Lobbying Strategy 
Besides these direct approaches the indirect lobbying strategy was used as well. 
The indirect influence was mainly done through the domestic level and the papers 
prepared for the consultation process play a major role. No regional office handed 
in a paper under the name of the regional office itself but most offices that lobbied 
actively for their interests participated in drafting the papers for their domestic 
regions. Out of the published papers, seven have a direct connection to the region 
within the participating offices17. It is unknown how much they might have 
contributed to papers. The offices have close links with their home offices and 
most of these papers were written in collaboration, some under the aegis of the 
Brussels office but mostly with the coordination lying within the region itself. 
Some offices even mentioned that they have not contributed anything to the 
papers of their region. “The paper was written by the staff back home and there 
was almost no input from the Brussels office.”  For some receivers this might be 
quite surprisingly because the Commission estimated that most of the papers were 
written within the regional offices. “With a paper from the region is very, very 
likely that their Brussels office has written at least half of it.”  Sometimes the shift 
from direct influence towards indirect shifted in the process. Some regions handed 
in very project related papers with mainly ‘good governance’ examples  to which 
the regional office contributed some expertise. Other regional offices mentioned 
that they have concentrated on a specific area. “We wanted to pick one subject 
and make it ours in order to have a voice in the bigger picture because it is so 
broad.”  Other offices focused on more general issues “we have been looking at 
the whole BSS as a more general and what we should doing. What we want to 
achieve with the paper.”  
6.1.2.3. Financial Lobbying 
Besides these two forms of lobbying which was mainly done by all active 
lobbying offices, one office and region has chosen a special way of interaction 
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 So far 78 contributions are published at the BSS webpage. In total the Commission received 110 
papers and it is therefore unknown how many papers were in reality submitted by the regions. To 
comply with the interviews this reflects the total number but no definite figures can be made. 
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with financial lobbying. This office relocated a staff member to the Commission 
as an ‘national expert’ and is still paying parts of his salary and he “works 
temporarily with the strategy.”  As a matter of course he is in close contact with 
the regional office he is usually working with. Another way of financial lobbying 
is the organisation of conferences within the consultation process. These 
conferences were expensive and required not only money but human resources. It 
should be mentioned that both ways of financial lobbying are paid by the region 
and therefore the region’s resources are the most important ones.  
6.1.2.4. Coalition Lobbying 
Another strategy is the one of building a coalition. The BSR offices, especially the 
smaller ones used this strategy extensively. This happens for time saving reasons 
“we co-operate and don’t waste time on boring meetings.” but mainly for 
networking purposes “for lobbying we combine our forces with the others.”
which is closely connected to the resource variable.  
The so called IBSG is a loose network of 50 to 55 offices from the greater 
BSR The exact number is unclear and has existed many years. “It is a very old 
network that is running for years and years and it was more informal and an 
exchange of opinion.”  Mainly this worked through an informal agreement. “We 
had a mailing list with the informal agreement that if anybody arranges a seminar 
or briefing event with somebody important can you tell all of us that we don’t 
have to bother that person but that anybody can profit.”  No membership fee 
applies which was appreciated frequently.  The IBSG has a steering group, 
consisting of 10 to 19 offices, which mainly encourages certain initiatives but 
every component can take the lead within certain objectives. “We are the ones 
suggesting what we should do and how we should do it.”  These are the ones 
paying for certain seminars and expenses. That is why they “are in a better place 
for the outcome. I think you can influence if you are not in the steering group if 
you invest time but the steering group meets a lot an exchanges information.” 
Besides the steering group, members don’t get engaged within all topics, only if 
they are interested.  It is seen as a give and take exchange. “We take terms and 
take over responsibility for a big thing and once you have done that you lay in the 
shadows for a while and float on the others work.”  
Initially founded as a simple mailing list to organize seminars and events it 
forms now several ad-hoc groups for certain specific issues, also for the BSS. 
“And then the Baltic Sea Strategy happened and suddenly there was this whole 
doctrine that in the Baltic Sea Group that we haven’t discovered before that hadn’t 
any importance.”  and the offices used this existing network for their work on the 
strategy. “The BSS raised the importance that we all felt to do something and the 
activities grew quite a lot.” Under the umbrella of the BSS “the work of the IBSG 
became so much more important and interesting once you have something 
concrete to work on.” Besides the conferences, they organized other lobbying 
channels. “When it came to lobbying on behalf of the IBSG that was taken care by 
the three leading offices.”  
The IBSG made a contribution for the consultation process and drafted a paper 
which was mainly organized as an opinion survey. “A questionnaire was sent to 
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the 55 offices that were members. And I collected the responses for one of the 
four topics and then we had a meeting” For each of the four main topics an 
coordinator was assigned by the IBSG. “We talked about it, what to take away or 
where to be more precisely and the we put it together and that was we sent in from 
the network and that was what we presented at the open days.” It was described 
as “a really great process.” and very collaborative. “It was very easy to give your 
input.” and especially the leading offices on the four topics could have had a lot of 
saying within the paper. “It was easy to find an coming agreement because we 
saw it in such different way that it was not really contradictory.”  This also raised 
some criticism because the outcome “was really just a list. You can always add 
something new to it and everyone wanted to have something on it.”  The paper 
had to be general. “It is 55 regions. And everyone wants to make their input. Even 
if they could get concrete ideas they couldn’t get other regions that like it. You 
have to make it extremely general.”  It was mentioned that the paper was good 
for the time is was written but in the end it was too general. “You have to keep in 
mind that is was prepared last summer and of course things develop even on a 
short period of time. It had to be modified to take into consideration for sure.”  
The perception of the IBSG for their lobbying tactics is differing within the 
offices. Whereas a few focused completely on the IBSG and on the paper 
prepared by this group and did not handed in a separate paper by the region , 
others only saw this as one aspect of their tactics. “The participation in the IBSG 
was not a priority. We participated but the priority was our own paper.” The 
reason for a sceptical participation was that “you define your main points of 
interests in the beginning and it makes no sense to adjust them afterwards to a 
larger group and subordinate your own interests.”  Also the tasks of the IBSG is 
seen differently. “I think for me the IBSG is about input and way of dissemination 
of information. I don’t see it as an active tool to make a concrete proposal.”  All 
offices agree on the fact that the IBSG is beneficial and a good tool to promote 
their interest. “The people see that it makes sense with the IBSG.”  Some even 
call it “a Baltic Sea family.”  But there is also the effect of the group “If I would 
be there alone I would have less power than with this load of power” . “I think 
this has been an door opener.”  In addition most of the smaller offices would not 
be able to promote their interest alone. “We are so small and when you are new it 
is an way to get an update because you cannot read everything and you get the 
contacts.” The group can also serve as a first way of interaction and clarification. 
“The common structure is needed because that is the first platform you can 
discuss. […]I remember that they had a group discussion about accessibility and 
in that projects discovered that well developed countries mean broadband, ICT 
and for countries like Poland it was mainly the transport infrastructure.”   
The offices of the BSR have a strong relationship”  which is unique within the 
field of the regional offices in Brussels. To the knowledge of the interviewees, no 
other macro-region has a network comparable to the IBSG. This cooperation is 
commonly known in Brussels and “I have the impression that the Commission is 
thankful for this exchange of the regions and offices”  
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6.1.3 The Anticipating Position 
The strategies of the offices participating in the study are mostly passive and 
active. A real anticipating strategy could not be identified at first glance. 
However, the analysis shows that some offices did prefer the anticipating position 
since the coalition is more of anticipating behaviour than of active. 
6.2 The Perception of the Strategies 
As the main actor within the BSS only the perception of the EC is reviewed and 
this brief analysis should help to classify the mobilization efforts of the office. It 
is seen as an contribution of the self-perception and the perception by others 
towards their strategies. 
The Commission officials mentioned that some regions were really active, but 
they haven’t received the same engagement by all the offices. “With a very few 
exceptions they haven’t called our office to arrange a meeting with us.”  And if 
they were contacted the preparation of the meetings leaved a lot to be desired. “I 
have been to quite a few meetings where I have been invited to meet a delegation 
from the region usually politicians as sort of the board of a municipality. When 
you have the time to meet politicians it’s been a good interaction.[…] But they 
had not prepared for the meeting they had no ideas oh what they should push for. I 
just told the process and the politicians have re-acted spontaneously how they do 
it as politicians but they weren’t prepared. They were no political stand for the 
region.”  This is overlapping with the statement by a few of the offices that the 
home level is not really interested in coming to Brussels, even though politicians 
are very welcomed guests (see 6.1.2.1). In general the positions of most of the 
regional offices were not clear to the Commission. “My impression is that very 
few regional offices have had a real strategy of how to approach the Commission 
with these work.” One or two regions have been visible and could therefore 
transport their interests better then others, which was closely related to the fact 
that a few have been very active with organising the conferences for the 
consultation process used this chance better than others.  
On the indirect lobbying level, most offices mentioned the papers for the 
consultation process and at least for the co-operation for the IBSG this was the 
main impact. The offices mentioned to spent a lot of time with writing these 
papers. “I don’t know if they were successful with specification of topics.” . The 
main problem of the papers was that they were to general, according to the 
Commission. The regions are aware of this fact but they could not transfer this to 
their work. “I think it is always important to have something concrete and make a 
proper proposals”  The Commission stated that some papers did not contributed 
anything towards the drafting of the BSS. “There is a BSS and that the 
environment is really important. I mean we know that. That’s the mistake most of 
them have done. They have been way to general. Sometimes you even have the 
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impression that some of them were really happy that they got something at the 
evening.” . Prioritizing their work would have helped to get more influence. “I 
think a lot of the regional offices could have turned up better work in identifying a 
few priorities they are pushing for and doing it more consistently.“  instead 
“almost nobody has done it and if at least one or two would have done it they 
could have a big influence if it would have been something narrow and substantial 
and has a point.”  Having in mind that the offices stated that they always got the 
sign of the Commission to address them in networks like the IBSG, this seems 
like a misunderstanding. However, the Commission had the impression that not 
respect and reluctance ha been the reason but indeed the regional offices had no 
clear vision of what to stand for. “I think more of the regional offices should have 
pushed for their home organizations to get clear stands. To develop two or three 
priorities.” If the offices would have approached the Commission with these 
priorities the potential impact that this mobilization would have been enormous. 
“This has been an open process. Nothing was written we have actually been 
looking for contributions and we have actually been looking for some new ideas.”. 
In summary it seemed as most of the offices have missed their chance to 
influence the BSS and within the following variables it will be analysed why they 
have not performed better when it comes to lobbying the Commission.  
6.3 The Variables of Mobilization 
6.3.1 First Set of Variables: The Case 
6.3.1.1. The Importance of the Baltic Sea Strategy 
The general importance or recognition of the Baltic Sea Strategy was mentioned 
by all interviewed regional offices without any exception. For all the offices, the 
BSS is a logical development since the BSR have been on the agenda of the 
regional offices for years. “I have been working here for 10 years and all this time 
the Baltic Sea area has been the main area”  It is seen as “something concrete for 
the first time”  The uniqueness of addressing a strategy for a macro region by the 
EU was highly appreciated by the interviewees. “A particular Commission policy 
that covers a particular region happens very, very rarely. All the other initiatives 
cover everybody. So it is very special.“  These symbolic aspects of the BSS are 
the ones that produce the engagement of the regions and offices.  
For some offices the BSS was of vital importance and it was put as an 
“outstanding” topic of the last years.  For these offices it has dominated the work 
ever since it appeared and this is one of the main topics they are working on the 
past year. For other offices in contrast, the BSS was quite important when it 
started. “So it was in the start-up phase I spent a lot of time” but then it was either 
taken over by the domestic level or all input was already given. 
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In contrast to the agreement on the stage of importance the expectations for 
the strategy differ. Whereas one sees the strategy with the BSS as something that 
might can make a difference, others don’t see its added value at this point. “We 
think that the BSS is a lot of words. What is really new to this? What does it really 
mean? There is no new money in it”.  These offices argue that the strategy without 
funding cannot fulfil the needs of the region. Money is the main argument in this 
respect “The guys in the parliament can be the dreamers. The Commission 
shouldn’t be the dreamers. And the Commission is not able to put this dream in 
practical because of the money”  The strategy will therefore not be of any added 
value. “It is too much empty talk. It has too many weak points. […] They don’t 
see the difference between strategy and programs. They mess it all up” . One 
interview partner stressed the point that the Union has to ‘sell’ the strategy to 
other regions outside of the BSR as well. “It is so much deluded to make everyone 
happy.”  Because of this lack of benefits these offices don’t see the reason to 
lobby. “If the BSS would be a new framework program we would probably try to 
lobby but now it is just a piece of paper.”  
The supportive offices see the problem of the missing budget as well. “The 
strategy must be filled with life but the question is where the financial funding is 
coming from.”  and admit that their hope might be disappointed. “It might be a 
total failure but at least we tried something new” . Most of the offices are aware 
that the strategy itself is not the main aspect within the future but “of course it will 
effect different programs, like Interreg.”  These offices expect more money for 
the region in the future. “I know that the paper will be with concrete ideas. 
Because with concrete you can always argue ‘where is the money for this?’. Ok 
now we are mentioned at the BSS we could get money.”  So were the hopes for 
the BSS expressed by one office as “more co-operation, more funding mainly.” . 
That is why they think it is worth to put effort and money into lobbying on the 
strategy at this point. The outcome might be unknown but “to have a good 
position the lobbying must be done now.” . Another aspect mentioned by a few 
participants was that the nature of the BSS was reconcilable with the structure of 
some of the offices. The BSS is neither left nor right wing policies and it was easy 
to agree on  and it covers a lot of policy areas. “Everyone was very interested. For 
different ways and different reasons because the BSS covers a lot, some more in 
maritime and safety issues, while others focused on economic issues.   
6.3.1.2. Channel of influence  
The offices used several different channels of influence to promote their interest, 
utilizing mainly already existing networks. “The network matters. And it matters 
what ideas and positions you had in the last few years”  The main object of 
lobbying of the offices was undoubtedly the European Commission. The usual 
way was the support of the home office within preparing a consultation paper, as 
well as the paper prepared by the IBSG (see 6.1.2.4). Mostly the offices tried to 
influence not only through papers but also through personal contacts. Placing the 
BSS within the responsibility of DG Regio was mentioned positively by the 
offices. “They know us already. They know what we can give them and they used 
us to get their message spread. And if the work would have been done by another 
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DG that would be different. Then they wouldn’t listen to us as much as they do 
now  “The European Commission when they spread the word on the Strategy it 
was like a carte blanche and this was a very good situation. They were very open 
minded and they were interested in any input from the region.”  The interaction 
with the EC was therefore unexceptional mentioned positively. “It is very easy to 
contact them. Whenever you need someone for a presentation or information.”  
Especially the nationalities of the people working on the strategy seemed helpful. 
“There are Swedish national experts sitting in the Commission and Finnish and 
Swedish people are working within the Commission.”  Here it was also 
mentioned that the more higher ranked people you know, the better chances of 
influence are expected. “The more magnates you know the more influence you 
have. If you know the Commissioner it is way better than if you only know the 
public servant.”  It turned out that organizing one of the conferences was one of 
the main advantages for further lobbying and collaboration with the Commission. 
At least one office used this special status, whereas other offices missed this 
opportunity. The initiative of preparing one conference was made from the 
Brussels office and was described as more of a coincidental incident.   
The Committee of the regions was a major channel of influence for some 
offices. “It is the formal lobby organization. Speaking that there is a government 
issue to it that the Committee of the Region should be interested in and have a 
look in […] On this issue they have been heard.”  Some offices prepare the work 
of their CoR members for them . Within the CoR the informal interregional BSG 
catches the main focus. It was mentioned that the regional offices had an input in 
the March paper published by the CoR.  Other offices mainly see the CoR as a 
contributor for more inside information and a better position in the lobby business 
“I am not a great believer of the Committee of the regions, but they open doors for 
me at the Commission. Sometimes you get the bigger people and they get 
additional information.” . It turned out that using the CoR as a channel is closely 
connected with whether or not the region has appointed a member in the 
Committee. ”We don’t have any members there and do not spent any time with 
that.”  
The EP was mentioned seldomly as the object of lobbying. Some offices have 
good and continuous relations with the parliamentarians from their region. “We 
try to give them additional input in a certain specific area where the region had 
placed their focus”.  Other offices stated that the parliamentarians of the country 
or region are not active in the Baltic Sea Region policies and therefore not of 
interest for the topic.  Others pointed out that the contacts with the 
parliamentarians are done by their home organization. “I go either through the 
PermRep or the Commission, not the parliament, because they know where we 
stand and the people at home do that. They have their parliamentarians from the 
regions back home and that is their job doing it from home.”  Another reason 
mentioned was that the parliament has currently no influence on the BSS and 
otherwise the opinions are already set. The EBIG of the parliament is seen as one 
initiators of the strategy. When writing the paper that was published in 2005, few 
regional offices had some influence on drafting the paper. A “very small circle of 
selected offices were the back offices. They have been consulting the first draft of 
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the Parliamentarian paper with the member of parliaments” . The influence done 
back then is seen as one of the main aspects concerning the BSS and also a reason 
why one office decided not to do further actions on the Commission.  
Contacts with the Permanent Representations are also important for some 
offices. It was mentioned that the regions cannot do something without the 
support of the member states and more support in this respect would be 
welcomed . It was mentioned that national parliaments are linked  as well as 
other Baltic Sea Networks. Organisations from the BSR and other bodies are seen 
as quite influential and most offices mentioned that their region is using contacts 
with these organisations, a few focus even completely on these networks. These 
connections and influence are done mostly at the domestic level and the offices in 
Brussels are not fully involved in these activities.  The influence of the networks 
is done through a connection of an politician that is a member in one of these 
organizations, and channels are seen by some regions as influential enough that 
the Brussels office is not playing a major role when promoting the interest.  
In summary, the regions had several channels of influence but mainly the 
Commission, the CoR and the networks as objects to spread their positions. An 
absence of interest to contact the Commission was therefore not visible. 
6.3.1.3. Time  
The importance of timing can be explained on where the formation of agreement 
that one of the stakeholder conferences was held. The initial plan was to continue 
a format of a conference series by the IBSG done in the years 2004 and 2006 in 
Brussels and combine one of the stakeholder conferences with the already existing 
format. The Commission however announced that they wanted to have two 
stakeholder conferences and four round- tables at the regions and then “a meeting 
was scheduled at the right time with the General Director of DG Regio and then it 
was decided that this will happen in our region.”  Other less fortunate offices 
mentioned that there were other plans of the IBSG, which was not realized 
“because the Commission already had offers from two cities.”  This ‘success’ was 
therefore only possible because of an early start. The Council made this decision 
in December and the Commission started working on it in January and then 
“everything went on quite quickly.”  Other offices had not such a quick response 
from home. “We were working a lot on it last spring in Brussels and back home 
they were moderately interested in it. And then during the summer it is all the 
articles in the news exploded and everyone was like ‘Oh this topic is so 
important’.”  “Re-action and action must happened early on” , otherwise there is 
no way of influencing the issues.  
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6.3.2 Second Set of Variables: The Office 
6.3.2.1. Focus of the Office 
Like expected in the theoretical framework, the self-perception of offices does 
vary. Some of them actually consider themselves as a ‘lobbying office’  whereas 
others don’t see this as their point of interest. “We are still an information office 
foremost, and we are still giving the information to the people back home.”  
Others see themselves as “an early warning station for home”  which coincides 
with an ‘information office’ which is characterized as “to inform home and to 
operate contacts” . This includes lobbying activities and most of the offices do 
certain interest representation duties, even if they would not consider themselves 
as lobbying offices. “We are basically informing a lot. We are not a lobby office. 
Even though we do that as well. We hand in position papers on cohesion policy, 
or the Baltic Sea Strategy.”  Most offices have several different tasks and call 
themselves “multi-functional.” The best would be to grade most of them on a 
scale between informing and representing. Nonetheless, there are offices that have 
a primary focus on projects within the region and that are mostly in Brussels to 
get project partner and acquisition of funding for these projects. “We spent most 
of the time on giving information on support programs and find partners in 
Europe more project orientated.”  These offices don’t lobby for political issues 
and if they do it is more related to certain projects and they help a city with 
appointments at the Commission, but not on “white and green papers” . 
In conclusion most of the offices have a lobbying mandate from their home 
offices, even if they would not call themselves that. There are a few offices that 
are mostly concentrated on project planning and less on the general politics and 
therefore not within an initiative like the BSS.  
6.3.2.2. Representation 
As explained, the organization and henceforth representation varies a lot between 
the different regional offices and the BSR is no exception. Within the study three 
different types of representation can be pointed out. The city offices, the offices 
representing an organization of various regional units and the offices representing 
a single government.18 
The first group of the city offices represents a single city or smaller regional 
unit. The staff of the office in the study was a civil servant paid by the city and 
was a one man office. The hierarchical structure is quite invisible and claims “we 
have been succeeding with the tiny team than some bigger ones. We have been 
pretty visible.”  
The second group of a joint representation is divided into two different ways 
of organization forms. Within the first form the amalgamation of different 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
18
 It has to be mentioned that some offices in the study just recently, in the last two years, 
underwent a change in their organizational structure. Two of them were formed into representing a 
more broader region, one of them was formed from a city office towards a regional office. 
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regional administration units (counties, cities and/or other regional bodies like 
universities or development agency’s) act as a loose network without any greater 
body. The connection between the Brussels office and the different partners at 
home are either done through a person or unit at each of these partners. Some 
offices have rotating chairs, where the partner in charge is acting as the main 
connection hub and is also paying the salary of the Brussels staff and because of 
this connection it is quite natural that the office works closest with the respective 
leader. This form of loose organization implies that a lot of co-ordination work is 
done at the Brussels office. “It is a lot of running around but there is no home 
office as such” . It also results in a stodgy process since “it is so slow and 
converse takes so much time.” Another form of organization can be the same 
cooperation of different regional bodies but with an assembly as a connection 
body. These ‘councils’ or ‘committees’ are mostly composed of politicians of the 
represented municipalities and the counties and the Brussels work is mainly 
embedded into other tasks of them. ”We have an international board with 
politicians that are meeting that meet once every 6 weeks and they make the 
decisions how we should work and on what we should focus and what efforts 
should be done.”  Some of the offices have so called ‘sister offices’ in the region 
which whom they work closely together.  The number of partners represented by 
the offices in the study ranged between 3 and 25 partners and these partners 
represent all kind of regional authorities as municipalities, cities, counties, 
regions, regional development agencies and universities. “Some of them don’t 
really have any powers and they are mainly in charge of regional development in 
their county. But others have strong delegation powers” This amount of partners 
can cause communication and coordination problems. The main problem is 
concrete issues cannot be developed since not all partners are equally interested in 
the same topics. One office mentioned it is “very, very difficult” to find an issue 
every member is pleased with. This can have an impact on their lobbying work. 
“The partners need to negotiate by themselves and need to have a clear stand on 
the issues before they come to Brussels. But some of them don’t really talk and 
then they come to Brussels and they don’t know about each other.”  Dealing with 
these different partner is clearly a problem for some offices. “Being an lobbyist 
you have to be very clear in your message and here you have completely opposite 
messages and I don’t know how I should represent this. The simplest choice 
would be not to do anything.”  A clear stance on these issues is indispensable. 
“They could still developed a more pragmatic point of view on certain issues. Not 
being so politicised but still for example push for one project that they can all 
agree on.”  Also positive aspects of representing a lot of members was mentioned. 
Many partners at home is beneficial because representing the whole region is 
important. “We are more partners. I could see that it is more stable. It is not 
politically sensitive.”  Besides the stable domestic representation, the sheer 
number of networks contributed by every partner was mentioned. “The advantage 
is that we have lots of active networks. In that respect the diversity is also a 
strength with their different issues.“  
The third form of organization is the representation of one single government 
with greater powers within the political decision making process. These offices 
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are part of the responsible department, mainly the one of external affairs, and act 
as their own division within the department under direct supervision of the 
departmental head. The sheer power makes them different to the other offices 
because they “have a completely different role within the treatment of the 
Commission.”  and “they have the population to act, the powers.”  Also the 
Commission confirms this impression since if “the region has some competencies 
in some areas, then I would rather listen to these offices.”  The importance of 
power relations is confirmed by the impression of the office. “When I go around I 
get asked quite often ‘do you have a political approval from the region?’ And 
when I can say yes I have they have approved this meeting it is always better.”  
Concerning the question of the represented some offices symbolize the whole 
region because of the number of partners. Other offices mentioned quite 
frequently that they not only represent the ones that are paying for their salary but 
furthermore the whole region, like developing agencies or universities.  This also 
applies for the offices that are part of a governmental structure. It was mentioned 
that the work “primarily for the regional government authority but also for 
municipalities, companies or universities.” .  
The findings show the form of representation has an huge impact on how the 
office performs. Firstly it is a question of power and secondly it is a question of 
how many partners are grouped at the local level. 
6.3.2.3. Resources  
The main difference between the different ways of representation is also visible 
within the resources. The rule, simply spoken; more power equates more money. 
Most of the offices representing a city or hub of regions have limited funds. “Our 
budget is very, very small and we are supposed to work on issues and do 
miracles.” Since the staff is the best indicator for resources it confirms this 
expression. Most of these offices have a staff of one to three persons in Brussels19 
which seems not enough. “Normally this office should have at least two people”
and even with more than one person the wish for more staff is there “Only three 
persons here. We should have at least one more” . They also do not see any 
perspective for a bigger budget in the future. “We are a small region and have that 
the partners are already paying as much as they can but it is not enough to do what 
we want to do” . The small budget is also one reason why there is the need for 
cooperation since it “is too small to make an impact so that is the reason why we 
have to co-operate with the other regions. Some offices representing an 
amalgamation of partners either have found their scope; “we are three senior 
people. We all know what we want out of this”  or already have a good size of 
staff at around six people, which is almost the same size as the offices 
representing powerful governments in the study. As expected within the 
theoretical framework, a higher staff also leads towards more specification of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
19
 In addition to the regular staff there all the offices mentioned that they have interns on a 
regularly basis that supports them within their work. Since all offices mentioned that these 
numbers are neglected within the count.  
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staff. The delegates usually come from the different departments and are therefore 
experts in their fields and only concentrate on their respective topics.  Applying to 
the BSS one office mentioned that one person’s task areas were remodelled so 
that he could concentrate almost completely on the strategy. A special Baltic Sea 
team was composed ad-hoc at the domestic level which was classified . A lot of 
additional funding was spent for the strategy, which is closely related to one of the 
stakeholder conferences taking place at the region. As aforementioned within the 
organization variable, the Brussels offices are usually embedded within a bigger 
home office which supports them with their work and provides them with 
expertise in certain topics. Firstly, the financial resources of this domestic region 
is the most important. Second of all the staff count is crucial. Here a difference is 
visible as well. Within the study these staff members and ranged from three people 
towards big departments supporting and co-operating the Brussels office. 
Sometimes the Brussels office is not even dealing with European issues and 
instead this is done at the domestic level. “The topic is not supervised by the 
Brussels office but at the section North-East Coast at the home department. The 
Brussels office supports the work but is not leading and therefore only reacts.”  
The regional offices are to some extent highly linked to their home offices and 
becomes unclear when dealing with how much work is actually done at the 
domestic level. Therefore the resources in the respect of people is hard to 
measure, but it gives an impression of the class distinction present within the 
offices of the BSR. The payment of a conference or the provision of a staff 
member for the Commission are two main aspects aforesaid. These are highly 
related to resources and show how important the resources from the domestic 
level are for the lobbying activities. 
6.3.2.4. Agenda- Setting 
All offices agreed on the fact that the main decisions and approvals are made at 
the domestic level because the regional offices primary lack of funding and all 
related competences. Most offices coordinate their work through an annual plan to 
ensure that the organizations at home know the issues they are focusing on and at 
the same time to get the approval for the topics they work on. “We work on the 
basis of planning. There is still room for spontaneous action but mainly is the 
annual action plan.” This plan is closely connected to the plans done within the 
region itself and the one published by the EC. Most of the offices, especially the 
smaller ones, compare both of these agenda-setting documents and pick the topics 
where they see a certain correlation.  The offices have a huge impact on these 
annual plans since “80 to 90% is coming from my side, we should do this and this 
will effect us”  and the practice to choose the topics is sometimes completely in 
the hands of the offices. “I pick the topics and the other agree”  The ideal way of 
agenda setting would be that the offices get advices from the domestic level on 
what they should work. In some cases this works better than in others and it has to 
be kept in mind that the regional office itself is not able to take the main 
decisions.  There is “always a clearance with the highest decision making body on 
the topic, constantly.”  Larger offices are especially distinguished by more strict 
hierarchical structures with the department each of the staff represents whlist at 
 41 
the same time they are quite autonomous when it comes to the topics they work 
on . The best condition for lobbying is if the highest decision making body at 
home can quickly adjust to the situation, including the financial planning. This 
hierarchical structure also results in the impression of an ‘imperative mandate’ 
how it was called in the theoretical part. “I know that in most of the offices they 
are strictly cordage by their home office what they are allowed to do. And quite 
often it came to the scene that in a meeting they say ok we need to call home and 
see if we can do it.”  Other offices enjoy freedom within their work to a great 
extent. “I don’t report to anyone at home about my work here. We do belong to 
the team of international issues but they are not our boss. We do a lot of things 
with them but not for them.”  One region mentioned that they act as a secretary of 
the home organization.  
One reason for this freedom might be that the domestic dimension is not 
familiar with the topics. “The ideal situation is that I am just the little handy man 
and they give me the tasks what to work on but in reality that doesn’t work like 
that. In the best cases you get exchange ideas initiated by the people at home but 
actually a lot of time is initiated here and people at home say yes or no.“  It is 
mentioned that the domestic staff don’t see EU issues as their main point of 
interest. “It is still quite strange to do EU business at home.”  They even see it as 
additional work when the Brussels office asks for more support on a certain issue. 
“It is not included in their normal work. It is something extra. And if you are not 
interested in that you don’t do it.”  This is depicted as an advantage for all aspects 
of their work. “When you need to be successful especially in terms of lobbying it 
requires a lot of time on the issue. And for them to spent time it has to be really 
important and really urgent.”  This is related to the issue of staff since the smaller 
the unit at home is the less are they interested in European affairs. The problems 
within the region are main objective of the regional administrations “But I try to 
tell them the EU doesn’t stop to work and wait until you have solved your internal 
regional problems.”  Some offices see a positive development concerning the 
issue. “It is hard to motivate people on European issues but it is getting better.”  
The BSS was mentioned to be a good initiative to show the politicians that they 
can influence EU decisions. One interview partner mentioned the experience of 
one politician out of the region at one of the stakeholder seminars where he 
mentioned a detail20 which was taken up later on. This experience had a huge 
impact in the further course of action since “he kind of got a boost out of that like 
‘it is so easy to influence EU legislation and have my opinion in that document’ 
and after that every one just talked about that the BSS was on top of the agenda.”  
It can be summarized that the domestic level plays an important role within the 
performance of the office. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
20The topic was on e-governance, somehow it was mentioned that information and communication 
technologies were surprisingly not mentioned (Schymik and Krumrey 2009: 8) within the last EC 
paper therefore it is. at this stage not clear if the BSS contains this point. 
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7 The Analysis of the Case Study 
7.1 Analysis of the Mobilization Variables 
Since the findings show that the different variables have to be seen in relation to 
each other, they cannot explain the lobbying processes when they stand alone and 
they are dependent on each other and therefore no direct answer on the hypothesis 
will be given. This analysis focuses on these relations and there are a few 
significant outcomes concerning the two questions asked in the beginning. 
 
 
Firstly, all offices were interested in the topic and most of them placed it high on 
their agenda. Nonetheless the offices choose different strategies. If an office takes 
the passive lobbying position the main reasons are that some Brussels offices have 
not been the leaders within the regional authorities to work on the strategy and a 
lot of work was done at the home level, which was mentioned by a few offices. 
Here the agenda-setting variable can be mentioned. In addition some offices were 
simply not engrossed in promoting their interest because of the general nature of 
the BSS, which is related to the importance of the topic variable. Another reason 
for choosing a passive approach is that the function of the office is a non-lobbying 
office. Resources do not play a role for a decision on active and passive lobbing, 
in contrast to the choice of the tactic. 
Most offices stated to take active lobbying actions. First through the active 
strategy when having direct contact, and second through the passive strategy when 
supporting the home office writing a paper for the consultation process and thirdly 
through coalition lobbying when forming an ‘informal Baltic Sea Group’ of the 
offices which also handed in paper for the consultation process. Financial 
lobbying was also done by one office extensively since it supported the 
Commission with human resources within the division that is writing the draft. 
What tactic they choose is highly related to the resource factor. Financial 
lobbying is only possible if the office has the resources, which is obvious. Active 
lobbying leads to a high human as well as time effort which some offices can 
simply not effort. Since resources are highly related to the art of representation 
this should be also mentioned. An office that has power is most likely to be 
interested in active lobbying than in a coalition. The factors of representation, 
What mobilization variables determines which lobbying strategy is used? 
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agenda-setting and resources are also highly related why some offices choose a 
coalition as their main point of impact. 
 
 
Since the study was connected to a real lobbying issue the contrast between the 
impression of the actors and objects was more than visible and showed what 
mobilization factors have an impact on the performance of the offices. The most 
successful lobbying tactics would be the direct lobbying strategy and the financial 
lobbying. Offices that were in a continuous contact with the region are most likely 
to place their ideas within the strategy. This contact was highly related to 
organizing a conference or position a staff member in the Commission. Both 
actions are highly related to resources. Even if the resources are available this 
does not necessary mean that the lobbying activities will be successful. It turned 
out that the papers handed in as well as the coalition did not equate a major 
impact. A clear and defined position, shortly expertise, was the main goods the 
Commission was asking for and only offices that could fulfil this criteria were 
successful. The reason why most indirect lobbying activities and the coalition was 
not successful was this lack of expertise. The offices which chose these strategies 
were not visible in promoting their interest for the EC because of the major failure 
of not delivering concrete ideas. Regardless, the coalition of the IBSG must be 
seen as a good initiative because it does create side effects that are important for 
future lobbying and for the information and exchange process of the offices. It 
turned out that the offices with less resources and no clear stance on the issue 
grouped themselves in the IBSG coalition and relied heavily on that input, doing 
little else besides. 
The mobilization variables delivers a pattern for what factors have to be 
fulfilled to deliver these concrete ideas. The variables of representation, agenda-
setting and resources can explain to a major extent why some have not been as 
successful than others. If the home level is interested in the topics and invests time 
and resources for the issue, the office can enable the transfer of this expertise and 
interest to the lobbying level. If the regional level is less interested or cannot 
forward an opinion the office can only exert low influence if any. This was also 
the outcome of previous studies (for example Bosselmann 2007: 56). The 
domestic level must therefore be ‘EU- skilled’ to handle the information given by 
the regional offices proper and efficient. The main point of successful lobbying, 
regardless if the direct, indirect, financial or coalition strategy was chosen, is a 
clear and defined position. Several offices had difficulties to provide this because 
of the following reasons:  
⇒ Who sets the agenda and how much this body is interested is the major 
factor. If this interest is not given the less likely it is an impact on the 
European level. One interviewee stated that “spending 6 months to find a 
common topic that every one in the end just go ‘Yeah that is ok but not 
something we are burning for’”  is not unusual for the work of the offices. 
Others have to fight for concrete ideas or invent them to have at least 
What form of lobbying tactics and mobilization is the most successful? 
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something   If the agenda setter is interested and committed towards the 
lobbying work of the office and in addition has a clear stand on an issue 
interest representation can be successful to a high extend. The representation 
organisation must be hierarchical but on the other hand quick and easy to 
react. It must be clear who takes decisions and the principal-agent 
relationship must be clear. The best would be a ‘free mandate’ but most 
offices have an ‘imperative mandate’. This is no disadvantage as long as the 
principal can reach a quick decision. 
⇒ Related to the agenda setting variable is the representation factor. The study 
pointed out if the office has many partners it is less likely that a concrete 
interest can be pointed out. This concreteness is necessary for any input. 
Therefore the offices with only one principal are in a clear advantage. This 
does not necessarily mean that an office with many partners can have no 
influence. A clear and quick position determines the outcome and if the 
partners can deliver this then their Brussels office can have an impact. The 
power question is not as important as expected. If the region has certain 
powers within the decision making process it might help with the 
acceptance of the issues presented but is not the main factor for successful 
lobbying, which is in contrast to previous findings that see a clear advantage 
for these regions because the powers in the EU “favour their unique legal 
status” (Moore 2008: 524). 
⇒ Resources do have an impact, since the office can perform certain tasks 
better with more staff members and as pointed out, financial lobbying 
played in important role within one office. Even with a one person office an 
impact would have been possible if the office would have had a clear issue 
to promote. “If someone calls me and says lets discuss the Baltic Sea 
Strategy than I would of course talk to them”  The study also made clear 
that the offices with more resources are better ‘in the game’ than others. 
Specialised staff is the key factor. Even if the study should not 
underestimate the factor of networks they do not have such a major impact 
as other studies has pointed out (for example Bosselmann 2007:54 or 
others).  
⇒ The time factor is more important than the art of representation. This factor 
is highly related to firstly, the agenda-setting variable and second to a 
certain kind of fortune of being at right time at the right place. 
⇒ The variable of channels of influence pointed out that the Brussels office is 
embedded in a domestic level and is using these channels as well. Further 
analysis of these channels is not possible. 
 
To combine these outcomes mentioned above even in more detail, the strategies 
of the offices can be illustrated in three different types of mobilization: the 
committed, the follower and the reluctant. With this different types a more 
complete picture and analysis can be drawn. 
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7.2 The Different Types of Mobilization 
 
In the following the different types of mobilization are presented. They aim to 
combine the different outcomes and group the offices into three different modes. 
 
 
If the offices have no clear position they take the approach of the follower. Even 
though this position was seen as an active position, it turned out that the 
impression lasted as if these offices pursue a ‘wait and see’ tactic. The lack of 
clearness and a real strategy makes them not a clear active actor and instead they 
are more in the ‘anticipating actor’ behavior scheme. 
 
 
 
 
The Active Position: The Committed 
The committed is characterized as the one that has a clear issue and invests 
all time and money to pursue this issue. “There is the need for details and 
concrete ideas: To be honest the way you read the papers is ‘are they 
concrete?’ Have they got something exiting new? Or are they just going 
through emotion?”  If the office has to office these concrete ideas then it 
needs to pursue this. Some offices in the study have been quite successful 
with this and used all different kind of channels. “You must be willing to 
invest time and money and then it goes its way then you can make the 
difference. If you don’t you will not get much impact” This of course 
implies certain expenditures that not every office can afford and also the 
ones that have the financial resources cannot handle this on a regular basis. 
The process and how it worked was “exemplary”, as one office stated and 
that this cannot always be done . Even if the office has not the resources it 
can have a good impact once it is committed to the topic and the issue it 
wants to lobby for. It was the “most intensive participation of a European 
topic since a long time”  which explains why this office was quite 
successful within his work. Even though if the mobilization variables 
representation, agenda-setting and resources play have an enormous 
impact on the performance, there is always some unpredictable luck aside. 
“It is quite like that being in the right place at the right time talking to the 
right people.” If all these factors work together well then the possibility 
that ‘the committed’ has a big impact is quite high.  
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The Anticipating Position: The Follower  
In the study these followers were the offices that worked mainly through 
the IBSG. Although being initially a good way to combine forces it turned 
out to be in the anticipating position and be nearly invisible. “I think most 
of the regional offices are members of the IBSG and they have counted 
that this will be enough what they are doing in that group. Although from a 
Commission point of few it’s been quite invisible what they have done.”  
The seminars organised by the group were received as a success but it was 
stated that the group lost its power afterwards, since the paper should have 
been revised and it was stated that it was far to general to make any 
influence possible. The paper of the IBSG was not received as a success as 
much as the conference. “If we look at the paper it didn’t add much.”  This 
lies in the nature of the coalition, since it is quite obvious that many 
partners have many different inputs and it is therefore hard to find a 
concrete issue. “When they all together in one group it dilutes the message 
the only thing they have in common is that they represent local and 
regional authorities. It becomes purely a governance question.”  The 
message of the coalition is therefore useless: “The message are the core of 
an effective lobbying campaign. Without a compelling message an 
organization will not get far” (Mack 2005: 343). The offices that tried to 
lean back and work as a group were not successful with their work. The 
IBSG is one channel of influence but should not be used alone. It was 
stated that the offices had the chance and they “blew it.”  because “they 
have been very loyal to the process of the IBSG but looking at our side and 
turn it from the sight they have been to loyal.” The offices should keep in 
mind that they are “not only partners but also competitors.” The reason 
why the offices so heavily relied on the IBSG can be explained with firstly 
the lack of resources and man-power and second with the lack of clear 
visions and expertise from home. The two aforementioned issues 
determine whether or not the mobilization of an office can be successful. 
So in defence, these offices could not act differently because the 
preconditions were not fulfilled. Additionally, the IBSG seems to be a 
competent tool for the regions on various other issues, but on primarily 
lobbying it seems not as much instrumental.  
It must be added that this characterization relies heavily in the impressions 
of the EC. However, it might be that other channels of influence have a big 
impact on the final outcome, which is not considered at this stage and the 
offices would have a active ‘committed’ position. Since the reason for the 
anticipating behavior is closely connected to their art of representation and 
agenda-setting is less likely that this happens.  
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The Passive Position: The Reluctant 
The reluctant is not very interested in lobbying. This can have various 
issues. One reason is that the region as such is not interested in the issue, 
which was not the case within the BSS. Another reason could be that the 
Brussels office was not interested in the case. This might be because the 
region is pursuing the lobbying activities from the home level and/or the 
office has other tasks than lobbying included in its outline. “I think it is a 
good way how we prioritize. BSS is a lot of work, we neglect people 
that call us and say we have this really good program and can you help 
us there. It is a way to bring the EU closer to the citizens.” The third 
reason why lobbying might not be the best strategy is the issue of the 
BSS. Some offices stated that they take the passive approach since they 
are not completely convinced that the BSS will bring any added value.  
It was mentioned the be “a mission impossible” . Mainly missing money 
was the reason for the reluctant strategy. This is a strategy where any 
mobilization has no significance since they are not interested in pursuing 
any influence. 
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8 Outlook and Conclusion 
The study has shown that the various offices have different ways of how to pursue 
its interest and how to mobilize it. In general there must be an added division 
between conditions provided by the office itself and conditions from the domestic 
level. The offices are well positioned but the main impact on mobilization is at the 
domestic level, which leaves a lot to be desired in some offices. It has also shown 
that internal matters are mainly affecting the outcome. This is contrary to what 
previous studies have pointed out. “Efforts to understand the mobilization of 
organized interests have turned away from focusing on their internal traits to 
assessing the environmental forces that influence the supply of lobbying 
organizations and the demand for their services.” (Gray et al. 2005: 404), since at 
least in this case all offices had the same chance to influence and some used this 
chance better than others. 
What can we learn from the study? It showed that expertise and concrete ideas 
and inputs are mainly the two determines for successful lobbying. The 
Commission is heavily relying on the expertise of the offices and even expressed 
the wish for more input from the offices. With the establishment of the offices the 
regions created a direct lobbying tool, which is important and welcome. A point 
that could not be touched upon is that the offices need to make more clear that 
they have a special stance, which these days they miss. They differ widely from a 
‘regular’ lobbying office in Brussels but somehow they cannot transport this 
difference in expertise and power towards their lobbying objects. One of the main 
changes the regional offices need to pursue is certain areas where they have clear 
powers and clear influence. If they work on these levels it is most likely that the 
regional office in Brussels can promote their interest successfully. The reason why 
some can’t fulfil these preconditions is the fact that they have neither the 
resources nor the support with expertise from home, partly because too many 
partners are involved within the decision making process. The only possibility for 
these offices to gain more influence or to work more efficient is to specialize 
themselves for the most important topics of the region in combination with more 
interest from the domestic level. It is therefore not advisable to cope a lot of 
different policy areas with an small amount, maybe even just one staff member. 
This leads to a waste of time and expertise that the region might have in certain 
specific areas and the office will not have a big impact.  
In conclusion, the BSR offices generally hold a good stance whose main 
reasoning for occasional poor performance stemming from their home level. In 
future the offices need to use the possibilities of direct regional lobbying more so 
since within the BSS the Commission states: the door may be open, but the 
responsibility of walking through belongs to the offices. 
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Executive Summary 
Since almost 25 years a phenomena reaches Brussels, the establishment of 
regional offices towards the EU. Today over 160 regions are present and most of 
them have, besides other tasks, a clear mandate: to lobby for their regions (Marks 
et.al. 2002). There have been various studies on the establishment of these offices 
on the European level and the influence of regions on general (Marks et. al. 1996), 
but this study goes one step beyond and focuses on the lobbying activities of the 
Brussels offices. The fact that the regional offices are present does not 
automatically mean that they have influence. “Ineffective political actors might 
gain access to an institution without being able to translate this advantage into 
concrete policy outcomes” (Bouwen 2002: 366). Concrete, it asks two key 
questions: Firstly, what mobilization variables determines which lobbying 
strategy is used? And secondly, what form of lobbying tactics and therefore 
mobilization is the most successful?  
Lobbying defined as “the stimulation and transmission of communication, by 
someone other than a citizen acting on his behalf, directed to a governmental 
decision maker with the hope of influencing his decision” (Milbrath in Sills 1991: 
442) and mobilization defined as “the engagement of regional offices within the 
institutions and processes of EU policy making” act as the main basic models. The 
study itself is a case study on a specific case: “The EU strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region”. On the means of this initiative the study analyses the behavior of the 
regional offices in Brussels in regard to lobbying. It is evident that regional offices 
act as lobbying facilitators. The main focus of this study lies not on the influence 
as such but on what factors shape interest in lobbying and what determinants have 
to be fulfilled that the actions taken by the office are successful. Based on this 
study the paper tells both, what is and what should be done within regional 
interest representation. This paper aims at creating a framework that helps to 
explain what different lobbying attributes are present within the different lobbying 
offices based on the Baltic Sea Strategy and a nearly complete study on the 
influence of the regional offices on the Baltic Sea Strategy should be delivered. 
The Baltic Sea Strategy is an initiative in the developing. The European Council 
gave within its Council conclusions from December 2007 the order to the 
Commission to draft this strategy until June 2009. Since then the European 
Commission is working on it under the supervision of DG Regio. Since the 
strategy was a carte blanche when they started they invited actors in the region to 
give input, either through a series of stakeholder conferences and meetings or 
through a consultation process where paper could be submitted. This open process 
makes it interesting for this study. Coming from this concrete case it should be 
analysed what the offices have done to represent their interest and what are the 
factors that determine these actions. Unlike most other works done on regional 
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influence, this paper aims to connect the practice with the theory. It wants to 
explain in theoretical terms what is happening at the practical level. In answering 
these questions a theoretical framework was developed. The first part of this 
theoretical framework focuses on different lobbying strategies (after Farnel 1994). 
There are three different strategies, the first being passive lobbying which is 
characterized as non-lobbying meaning that the offices take no action at all. The 
second one is the anticipating strategy which includes no action neither, but is on 
a slightly more active level since it includes possible actions at a later point. The 
third strategy is the one commonly known as lobbying, active lobbying which is 
characterized as actively influencing the policy and direct contacts with the 
lobbying addressee. This strategy can be carried out with four different tactics, 
direct lobbying, indirect lobbying, financial lobbying and coalition lobbying. 
Direct lobbying again being characterized of “close cooperation” (Gais and 
Walker 1991: 103) of the lobbyist and the addressee, whereas indirect lobbying 
refers to actions that are taken to influence the public or influencing circuitous. 
Financial lobbying is related to giving resources of all different kinds, including 
human resources, to the lobbying object and coalition, known from negotiation 
theory refers to the increase of power by the fusion of many. Here two main 
aspects are interesting: formation and stability (Dupont 1994: 149). The study 
moves on with questioning what different mobilization variables have an 
influence on the choice and performance of these different strategies. With the 
usual theories used in the field, the mobilization of regional offices cannot be 
explained and theories from other fields had to be considered. More than one 
theoretical approach has been followed to build and develop this theoretical 
framework. The variables are divided into two different sets: the topic itself and 
the office. This distinction is necessary to get to know if some issues of 
mobilization are only connected to the BSS or if it can be seen as a general 
course. The office variables are based on ‘organizational theory’ within 
negotiations (Kolb and Faure 1994) which is referring to structures affecting 
negotiations in general. 
The variables from the both sets should explain if mobilization has an impact 
on the strategy of the offices, each assigned with a hypothesis. The main 
assumption that combines all these different variables is the hypothesis that 
‘mobilization matters’. Within the first set of the topic, these are the variables of 
importance which should explain what relevance the BSS has to the office. The 
second variable deals with the different channels of influence. Since the main 
actor within the BSS is the Commission at the time, within the brief perception of 
the strategies, only this channel was analyzed. The next variable is time. Relying 
on Pierson (2004), time matters within the decision making process. It is therefore 
of interest when lobbying actions were taken. The second set of variables deals 
with the structures of the office itself. Here the first variable is connected to the 
focus of the office. Several scholars have pointed out that offices have several 
different tasks to fulfill and that it might be a simple information gathering office. 
The second variable in that field deals with the art of representation. Since regions 
have several different ways of setting up an office this variable is closely 
connected to the question how powerful the region is and how many partners are 
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supporting the office. It is the question of “single region versus pluri-region” 
(Marks at al. 1996: 12). Within this variable it is the assumption that the less 
partners the better the office can perform. The third variable in the office set is the 
one of resources. Resources are important for lobbying and the “resource push” 
variable (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1216) might explain the choice of a strategy. 
Resources are also highly linked to the number of staff members and the expertise 
on certain fields. The last variable is the one of the agenda-setter. Here it matters 
who takes the final decision and how interested these decision makers are in the 
European topics. Based on the principal-agent theory different ways of behavior 
and competences are pointed out between the agent (regional office) and the 
principal (domestic level). Following Jönsson and Hall whom applied this model 
to diplomacy; different ways of acting, behavior and status, as well as different 
ways of freedom, free mandate and imperative mandate, are pointed out.  
Following this theoretical framework a presentation of the findings are 
detailed along with the analysis. Since the study was connected to a real lobbying 
issue the contrast between the impression of the actors and objects was more than 
visible and showed what mobilization factors have an impact on the performance 
of offices. It turns out that the different variables have to be seen in relation to 
each other and not by itself, so a direct answer on the hypothesis could not be 
given. There are a few significant outcomes. All offices were interested in the 
topic and most of them placed it high on their agenda. Nonetheless the offices 
chose different strategies. If an actor takes the passive lobbying position the main 
reasons are that some Brussels offices have not been the leaders within the 
regional authorities to work on the strategy and a lot of work was done at the 
home level, which was mentioned by a few offices. In addition some offices were 
simply not interested in promoting their interest because of the general nature of 
the BSS or the function of the office as a non-lobbying office. Resources do not 
play a role for a decision on active and passive lobbing. Most offices stated to take 
active lobbying actions. First through the active strategy when having direct 
contact; second, through the passive strategy when supporting the home office 
writing a paper for the consultation process; and thirdly through coalition 
lobbying when forming an ‘informal Baltic Sea Group’ of the offices which also 
handed in paper for the consultation process. Financial lobbying was also done by 
one office extensively since it supported the Commission with human resources 
within the division that is writing the draft. The chosen strategy therefore mainly 
concerned itself with variables relating to importance of the topic, focus of the 
office and resources.  
Concerning the second research question, determining the most successful 
lobbying strategy it emerged most offices were not visible in promoting their 
interest for the EC. The variables of time, representation, agenda-setting and 
resources can explain their ineffectiveness despite the plausibility of possible 
success. The main point of successful lobbying, regardless if the direct or indirect 
strategy was chosen, is a clear and defined position, shortly: expertise. This is the 
main goods the Commission was asking for and only offices that could fulfil this 
criteria were successful. If the home level is interested in the topics and invests 
time and resources for the issue, the office is enabled to transfer this expertise and 
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interest to the lobbying level. If the regional level is less interested or cannot 
forward an opinion the office can only exert low influence if any. The domestic 
level must therefore be ‘EU-skilled’ to handle the information given by the 
regional offices proper and efficient, which refers to the agenda-setting aspect. 
The power question was also mentioned, but was not as significant as expected. If 
the region has certain powers within the decision making process it may help with 
the acceptance of the issues presented but is not the main factor for successful 
lobbying. More integral to success is the enthusiasm of the office for a certain 
issue. The clearness of the promoted interest is difficult to get from the home level 
if the office represents several actors. This is related to resources. It turned out 
that the offices with less resources and no clear stance on the issue grouped 
themselves in the IBSG coalition and relied heavily on that input, not doing much 
else besides. This turned out unsuccessful. Even with a one person office an 
impact would have been possible if the office would have had a clear issue to 
promote. The offices with more resources and more expertise were more likely to 
succeed but here there were differences as well. Resources do have an impact, 
since the office can perform certain tasks better with more staff members and as 
pointed out financial lobbying played in important role within one office. Time 
factors are important, which is highly related to firstly, the agenda-setting variable 
and second to a certain kind of fortune of being at right time in the right place. To 
complete the analysis, three different types of mobilization are presented that 
combine research question one and two. These three different types are: the 
committed, the follower and the reluctant. With this different types a more 
complete picture and analysis can be drawn. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Interview Guide Regional Offices 
 
 
Interview Guide 
 
BEFORE THE INTERVIEW, I HAVE TO INFORM YOU ABOUT A FEW FORMAL 
REQUIREMENTS DUE TO ETHICAL ISSUES ACCORDING TO ACADEMIC STANDARTS. 
FIRST, YOUR PARTICIPATION IS COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY AND YOU HAVE THE 
RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE STUDY ANYTIME AND/OR NOT TO ANSWER 
PARTICULAR QUESTIONS. OUR CONVERSATION WILL BE TAPED AND THE STUDY 
WILL BE COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL AND ALL NAMES WILL BE MADE 
ANONYMOUS WITHIN FURTER USAGE OF THE INTERVIEW. I, AS A RESEARCHER, 
HAVE NONETHELESS THE RIGHT TO USE ALL STATEMENTS AND PUBLISH THE 
INTERVIEW OR PARTS OF IT.  
 
 
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE START THE INTERVIEW? 
 
1. The Office 
 “First I would like to know a little bit more about your office in general” 
1.1. Whom does it represent? (local government, municipalities, other administrative 
body?) 
1.2. Who is directly responsible for it at home? Is there a connection unit at home? 
1.3. What is the structural background has the office? How is it organized? 
1.4. (Size) How big is the office? How many permanent staff members? 
1.5. (Staff) How is the staff recruited? Where is the staff recruited? What background 
have they usually? 
1.6. Is it usually a temporary position in Brussels or is it permanent? 
1.7. (Self- determination) Is the staff able to work completely on their own or do you get 
instruction, if yes from where? 
1.8. (information access) Where do the office usually gets its information from concerning 
its work on interest representation? Home administration? Commission? Networks? 
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2. The EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
“The second set of question is about the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region 
in particular” 
2.1. How important is this initiative for your office? For your work? 
2.2. Who decided that this topic is interesting for your region/ your office? 
2.3. What is special about it for your region? If anything is special about it.  
2.4. Or is it just another topic you work on? 
2.5. What are the main point of interest?  - Environment, Economic issues, social welfare 
issues, security? 
 
3. Processes 
 “The next set of questions deals with the processes of how you presented your 
interest within the Baltic Sea Strategy” 
3.1. How do your office/ you represent your interest? 
3.2. Do you know people or how does it work? Do you have personal contact with the unit 
at the Commission? Or other bodies? 
3.3. When do you have started to give your input? At the very beginning? Or wait and 
listen? 
3.4. (Coalitions) Do networks with other offices, bodies exist to promote a common 
interest? Who builds up these networks – You in Brussels or at home? 
3.4.1. Why does is arise? Just for this initiative or does is exist constantly? 
3.4.2. Is there a leader within this coalition/ network? 
3.4.3. Do all of the coalition partners have the same objectives and positions or are they 
split for example in the main interest?  
3.4.4. Do you think that coalition helps in promoting a common interest? 
3.4.5. Do you think offices outside of the BSR have a different interest? 
3.5. Do NGO’s play a role? 
 
4. My last question 
“If you compare your office to other offices. What do you think is your main 
advantage and what is the main disadvantage?” 
 
DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO TELL ME THAT I HAVE NOT 
MENTIONED OR ASKED THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION BEFORE I FINISH THE 
INTERVIEW? 
 
Thank you very much for the interview. In case I have any further questions do you mind if I 
contact you via email to clarify these? And once I have finished the thesis I will send you a 
copy probably mid June (just when the Baltic Sea Strategy got published).  
 
Once again thank you very much! 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide Commission 
 
 
Interview Guide 
 
BEFORE THE INTERVIEW, I HAVE TO INFORM YOU ABOUT A FEW FORMAL 
REQUIREMENTS DUE TO ETHICAL ISSUES ACCORDING TO ACADEMIC STANDARTS. 
FIRST, YOUR PARTICIPATION IS COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY AND YOU HAVE THE 
RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE STUDY ANYTIME AND/OR NOT TO ANSWER 
PARTICULAR QUESTIONS. OUR CONVERSATION WILL BE TAPED AND THE STUDY 
WILL BE COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL AND ALL NAMES WILL BE MADE 
ANONYMOUS WITHIN FURTER USAGE OF THE INTERVIEW. I, AS A RESEARCHER, 
HAVE NONETHELESS THE RIGHT TO USE ALL STATEMENTS AND PUBLISH THE 
INTERVIEW OR PARTS OF IT.  
 
 
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE START THE INTERVIEW? 
 
5. The Unit 
 “First I would like to know a little bit more about your unit in general” 
5.1. How is the Unit organized? What is the structural background? 
5.2. How works the collaboration with the other DG’s/ Units? 
5.3. How many people work on it in total? 
5.4. How was the strategy developed? 
5.5.  Is the staff able to work completely on their own or do you get instruction, if yes from 
where? 
 
6. The EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
“The second set of question is about the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region 
in particular” 
6.1. How important is this initiative for the DG region? 
6.2. There was a consultation process. How did it worked? 
6.3. How do you decide what’s in the Strategy and what’s out? 
6.3.1. It is said that so far the topics are to broad to have an impact. How do you decide 
whether or not to specify it?  
6.4. What is special about it for the Commission? If anything is special about it. Or is it just 
another topic you work on? 
6.5. What are the main points of interest from the region?  - Environment, Economic 
issues, social welfare issues, security? Was there a ‘hot’ topic. 
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6.6. There are so far only 47 published but 110 were turned in – what was in the others? 
Why were they not published? 
 
7. Processes – Commission/ Regional Offices 
 “The next set of questions deals with the processes and how the regional 
offices presented their interest within the Baltic Sea Strategy” 
7.1. 31 papers within the consultation from the regions. How many of them have clearly 
an impact of the regional offices or home-based work? 
7.2. Where you addresses directly? How does it usually work? 
7.3. When do the offices have started to give your input? At the very beginning? Or wait 
and listen? 
7.4. Do you see any networks between the offices? 
7.5. Do you have any contacts with offices and regions outside the BSR? Or do they play 
no role at all? 
7.6. Who role have the regional offices of all the different interest representations? 
7.7. Do you differ between the offices (some more trustworthy and why – others not) – 
why country, size, influence? 
 
8. My last question 
“What is your general perception of the regional offices in Brussels and do you 
think they are influential?” 
 
DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO TELL ME THAT I HAVE NOT 
MENTIONED OR ASKED THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION BEFORE I FINISH THE 
INTERVIEW? 
 
Thank you very much for the interview. In case I have any further questions do you mind if I 
contact you via email to clarify these? And once I have finished the thesis I will send you a 
copy probably mid June. 
 
Once again thank you very much! 
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Appendix C: Lobbyism and Theories 
 
 
The classical theoretical approaches can only partly explain lobbying. There are 
the state-centric models, the supra-national models and the multi-governance 
approaches. The first ones offer some ideas but cannot contribute theoretically to 
neither the existence of lobbying nor the set-up of regional offices.  
Within the theory of neofunctionalism the scholars developed a supranational 
political organization and had hopes that interest groups could foster the European 
integration. It turned out that these hopes could not be fulfilled in reality (Haas 
1958, Lindberg 1963, Kohler- Koch 1992). In the mid-1980s, new theoretical 
approaches emerged and with them a closer look on interest representation in the 
EU. Taking up the thought of the neofunctionalists the supranational 
institutionalists presented their ideas that within the times of further European 
integration business interest actors might foster this transformation. In contrast to 
the previous approach they could later prove this argument empirically (Sandholtz 
and Zysman 1989, Cowles 1997). Liberal intergovernmentalists in contrast argued 
that business interests have no impact in major policy decisions and can therefore 
be neglected (Moravcik 1998). All these main theories are common in that they 
focus on the general question whether or not interest group representations have 
an impact within the development of the EU. Other theories conversely focus on 
specific aspects of interest representation. A major theory on interest 
intermediation exists and they argued that informal, sectoral and pluralistic 
patterns are present (Averyt 1977, Streeck and Schmitter 1991). Moving on from 
this perspective the pluralistic approach developed (Coen 1998, Schmidt 1999, 
Broscheid and Coen 2003). Within elite pluralism, a credibility game is visible 
and the Commission tries to build up long-term relationships with interest groups 
based on their open consultation processes and the permanent information 
exchange. Others have quasi-corporatist views on the interest intermediation in 
the EU with its attention to resource exchange and compliance (Falkner 1998). 
Besides the view on interest intermediation, another part of the theorists view on 
the democratic deficit evolving out of interest group representation (Finke 2007). 
 
